Karl reMarks

...and 20 Great Translated Arab Novels

2012-01-13T09:00:00.000-08:00

Following my last post 'The ultimate 100 best English-language novels', I compiled a list of 20 great Arab novels translated into English. This should come in handy for people who are interested in Arabic literature but can't speak Arabic. Unfortunately, there are many novels that have never been translated into English, such as Haidar Haidar's 'Banquet for Seaweed', and others have been translated into German but not English.

As usual, your comments and suggestion are welcome, hope you find this useful:

The Animists by Ibrahim al-Koni

Beirut Nightmares by Ghada Samman

The Cairo Trilogy by Naguib Mahfouz

The Call of the Curlew by Taha Hussein

Children of the Alley by Naguib Mahfouz

Cities of Salt by Abdelrahman Munif

The Committee by Sun' Allah Ibrahim

Death in Beirut by Tawfiq Yusuf Awwad

For Bread Alone by Mohamed Choukri

Gate Of The Sun Elias Khoury

The House of Mathilde by Hassan Daoud

In Search of Walid Masoud by Jabra Ibrahim Jabra

The Long Way Back by Fuad Al-Takarli

Memoirs of a Woman Doctor by Nawal El Saadawi

Men in the Sun by Ghassan Kanafani

Passage to Dusk by Rashid al-Daif

Season of Migration to the North by Tayeb Salih

The Secret Life of Saeed: The Pessoptimist by Emile Habiby

The Sinners by Yusuf Idris

War in the Land of Egypt by Yusuf Al-Qaid

The ultimate 100 best English-language novels list

2012-01-12T08:24:00.000-08:00

Over thepast few years, I have being referring to a number of ‘100 Best Novels’ liststo fill the gaps in my knowledge about literature and discover new authors andnovels. The five main lists I have been using are Modern Library’s 100 best novels ofthe 20^th century (English-language), TIME magazine’s all-TIME100 Novels (1923-2005, English-language), The Observer’s 100 greatestnovels of all time, the BBC’s Big Read top 100 novels,and Le Monde's 100Books of the Century.

I haveattempted to compile a definitive list based predominantly on the five lists inaddition to a few novels that I thought deserved to be on the list. Becausesome of the lists are only for English language novels, I thought it’s fair formy list to also have only English-language novels. I am working on another listfor international novels.

While TheObserver and The BBC lists have some non-English novels, they are skewedtowards English-language novels and specifically British novels. By contrast,TIME and Modern Library’s lists do not favour American novels. Le Monde’s listis excellent, but it is not restricted to novels. It’s the only list however onwhich you will come across Georges Perec’s masterpiece Life A User'sManual.

There arefour novels that feature on all five lists, they are: Nineteen Eighty-Four byGeorge Orwell, On the Road by Jack Kerouac, The Catcher in the Rye by J.D.Salinger and The Great Gatsby by F. Scott Fitzgerald. There are also eightnovels that appear on four of the five lists, such as Catch-22 by Joseph Hellerand Lolita by Vladimir Nabokov, and a further nine that appear on three of thefive lists, such as Animal Farm by George Orwell and The Big Sleep by RaymondChandler. Lastly, there are fifty-six novels that appear on two of the fivelists.

Without furtherado, here is the list below. Please feel free to leave your comments andsuggestions.

A Bend in the River

V. S. Naipaul

A Clockwork Orange

Anthony Burgess

A Dance to the Music of Time

Anthony Powell

A Farewell To Arms

Ernest Hemingway

A Handful of Dust

Evelyn Waugh

A House for Mr. Biswas

V.S. Naipaul

A Passage to India

E.M. Forster

Alice's Adventures In Wonderland

Lewis Carroll

All the King's Men

Robert Penn Warren

American Pastoral

Philip Roth

An American Tragedy

Theodore Dreiser

Animal Farm

George Orwell

Appointment in Samarra

John O’Hara

As I Lay Dying

William Faulkner

Atonement

Ian McEwan

Blood Meridian

Cormac McCarthy

Brave New World

Aldous Huxley

Brideshead Revisited

Evelyn Waugh

Carter Beats the Devil

Glen David Gold

Catch-22

Joseph Heller

David Copperfield

Charles Dickens

Death Comes for the Archbishop

Willa Cather

Deliverance

James Dickey

Emma

Jane Austen

Frankenstein

Mary Shelley

Go Tell it on the Mountain

James Baldwin

Gone With the Wind

Margaret Mitchell

Gulliver's Travels

Jonathan Swift

Housekeeping

Marilynne Robinson

I, Claudius

Robert Graves

Infinite Jest

David Foster Wallace

Invisible Man

Ralph Ellison

Kim

Rudyard Kipling

Little Women

Louisa M. Alcott

Lolita

Vladimir Nabokov

Lord Jim

Joseph Conrad

Lord of the Flies

William Golding

Loving

Henry Green

Lucky Jim

Kingsley Amis

Midnight's Children

Salman Rushdie

Moby-Dick

Herman Melville

Money Martin

Amis

Naked Lunch

William S. Burroughs

Native Son

Richard Wright

Neuromancer

William Gibson

Nineteen Eighty-Four

George Orwell

Nostromo

Joseph Conrad

On the Road

Jack Kerouac

Pale Fire

Vladimir Nabokov

Portnoy's Complaint

Philip Roth

Possession

A.S. Byatt

Rabbit (Series)

John Updike

Ragtime

E.L. Doctorow

Revolutionary Road

Richard Yates

Robinson Crusoe

Daniel Defoe

Slaughterhouse Five

Kurt Vonnegut

Sophie’S Choice

William Styron

Tess Of The D'Urbervilles

Thomas Hardy

The Adventures of Augie March

Saul Bellow

The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn

Mark Twain

The BFG

Roald Dahl

The Big Sleep

Raymond Chandler

The Bridge of San Luis Rey

Thornton Wilder

The Call Of The Wild

Jack London

The Catcher in the Rye

J.D. Salinger

The Crying of Lot 49

Thomas Pynchon

The Day of the Locust

Nathanael West

The Death of the Heart

Elizabeth Bowen

The Fountainhead

Ayn Rand

The Godfather

Mario Puzo

The Golden Notebook

Doris Lessing

The Good Soldier

Ford Madox Ford

The Grapes of Wrath

John Steinbeck

The Great Gatsby

F. Scott Fitzgerald

The Heart is A Lonely Hunter

Carson Mccullers

The Heart of the Matter

Graham Greene

The Lion, The Witch and the Wardrobe

CS Lewis

The Lord of the Rings

J. R. R. Tolkien

The Magnificent Ambersons

Booth Tarkington

The Magus

John Fowles

The Moviegoer

Walker Percy

The Naked And The Dead

Norman Mailer

The New York Trilogy

Paul Auster

The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie

Muriel Spark

The Rainbow

D.H. Lawrence

The Sheltering Sky

Paul Bowles

The Sound and the Fury

William Faulkner

The White Tiger

Aravind Adiga

The Wind in the Willows

Kenneth Grahame

The Woman in White

Wilkie Collins

Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy

John Le Carre

To Kill a Mockingbird

Harper Lee

Tristram Shandy

Laurence Sterne

Tropic of Cancer

Henry Miller

U.S.A.(Trilogy)

John Dos Passos

Ulysses

James Joyce

Under the Net

Iris Murdoch

Under the Volcano

Malcolm Lowry

Wide Sargasso Sea

Jean Rhys

Wuthering Heights

Emily Bronte

Prospects for Iraq in the aftermath of the American withdrawal

2011-12-22T11:04:00.000-08:00

Video of my appearance on RT to discuss the situation in Iraq.

Who's Afraid of the Big, Bad Political Islam - The Debate

2011-12-21T05:21:00.000-08:00

A debate about the success of Islamists in the Egyptian elections and what means that I took part in on VOR.

The STL and the 32 million dollar question: The Winners and the Losers

2011-11-30T08:46:00.001-08:00

To fund or not to fund, that is the question. The uncertainty over paying Lebanon’s contributions to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon has occupied politicians for the past few months and cast a shadow over Najib Mikati’s cabinet since its inception. After hinting at resignation last week, today Mikati announced that he had used funds from the Disaster Relief Commission, which is under the PM’s direct control, to pay Lebanon’s contributions to the STL. The announcement followed intense last minute efforts by the Speaker Nabih Berri to avert Mikati’s resignation and the collapse of the government.

The immediate significance of this decision is that the showdown over the STL has been delayed for at least another year. Quibbling over the funding of the Tribunal was more of a symbolic confrontation that allows the different parties to make a show of sticking to their positions without making any real impact on Lebanon’s relationship to the STL. As I have argued before, neither the STL opponents nor its supporters have maintained a principled stance towards it. The legacy of this short-sightedness and lack of spine means the addition of another chronic issue to plague Lebanese politics to the host of ingrained concerns.

However, in the short term, PM Mikati seems to have negotiated the STL issue very well and used his clout to pass the funding decision despite the empty protestations of his ‘allies’ in Hezbollah and Aoun’s FPM. In effect, the ‘formula’ that Nabih Berri godfathered was a face-saving mechanism designed for the benefit of Hezbollah and the FPM. Mikati’s credentials among Sunnis will no doubt be boosted by this decision. This boost will further undermine Saad Hariri’s claims to the premiership as Mikati’s ‘third way’ appears to be paying dividends. In the absence of a real appetite for changing the cabinet, partially due to the situation in Syria, Mikati can continue to build a solid base of support while Hariri remains in his self-imposed exile.

In parallel, Berri’s timely intervention illustrates the unique role that he plays within Lebanese politics as a consensual figure. Berri cannot afford Hezbollah’s hardline tactics, and his authority has been built since the 80s on his skill in manufacturing consensual arrangements. Such arrangements represent a constant feature of the Lebanese political system and its aversion to conclusiveness. Berri’s intervention prepares the groundwork for the role he will play in the next stage in Lebanese politics, a role that unlike Hezbollah he has to constantly maintain.

When it comes to Hezbollah and the FPM, their acquiescence on the issue of the STL funding exposed the distance between rhetoric and practice that typifies their brand of pragmatism now. It is particularly revealing in the case of Hezbollah whose members were named in the STL indictment. This could be a tactical decision to delay the final confrontation over the STL until the situation in Syria clears up, but it is more likely a symptom of their chronic disaffiliation with the state that allows to see themselves simultaneously within and without its jurisdiction. This is often expressed through Hassan Nasrallah’s ‘assertive indifference’, to coin a phrase, over matter such as the STL.

The biggest losers however have to be March 14, who have invested so much hope and political capital in the STL, only to see it adopted by Mikati now. Their position is further weakened by the fact that Mikati can now exploit his support for the STL politically while they won’t be able to make any political gains through it. It is very hard to see what March 14 stands for anymore, as they continue to slowly decline into irrelevance in the absence of any clear plan for regaining power. As recently as July, they were still pinning their hopes on the STL and failing to anticipate that Mikati could negotiate this hurdle and turn it into a political advantage.

But the Lebanese people also lose as the STL becomes an entrenched divisive feature on the political scene, and one that we cannot influence ourselves.

Egyptian Limbo - Discussion on Russia Today Crosstalk

2011-11-25T03:28:00.001-08:00

Video of the Russia Today 'Crosstalk' discussion I participated in to discuss the renewed uprising in Egypt.

Lebanon’s Multicultural System: No Vacancy!

2011-11-18T09:10:00.001-08:00

National myths can often mean little in practice. However, they represent a good way to interrogate the ideals that a nation holds and how consistently they inform its politics and policy. How can we for example reconcile Lebanon’s self-image as a shelter for persecuted minorities with the antagonism towards newcomers? How could we tolerate the rhetorical celebration of Lebanon’s diversity while the army and security forces wage a brutal campaign against migrant workers in Beirut?

We could argue that those ideals never really mattered and that they were always used cynically to promote an underserved image. But I find it more useful to understand this cleavage between our ideals and our pathetic lack of consistency in upholding them. It is also important to challenge the political class and the way it appropriates and subverts those ideals. We can build a new form of politics around this engagement that is grounded in our reality and aspirations.

So let’s look at the ongoing campaign against migrant workers which was sparked off by the rabid Murr TV report. The rise in crimes levels in the areas of Dawra, Nabaa and Bourj Hammoud was blamed on the migrant workers who live there, and a campaign of arrests and forced evictions targeting both legal and ‘illegal’ migrant workers followed. The campaign was characterised by arbitrariness and the intent to demean and denigrate migrant workers. What is the source of this vindictiveness?

To understand that it’s useful to examine the nature of Lebanon’s multicultural system. As the modern state took shape this developed into a formal and managed socio-political system that empowers confessional groups but with some necessary exclusions in place. The bitter irony of the migrant workers’ saga is that it takes place in a neighbourhood associated with the Armenian community, and is driven by the largest Armenian party, the Dashnak. The case of Armenian migration to Lebanon and subsequent integration should be seen as a model for successful immigration, were it not for the conditionality that characterised this integration. Armenians were required to behave as one political block to prop the existing order with no tolerance for individual dissent.

This placed Armenians under the same burdens that members of other groups have to cope with: demands for allegiance and the difficulty of behaving as individuals. In parallel, the same status that the Armenian community acquired was not granted to other groups, like the Syriacs and the Assyrians for example, who remained largely marginalised. Many of them are still deprived of the Lebanese nationality despite living in Lebanon for decades. (Not to mention the Palestinians of course, but there are a number of other factors involved in their case.)

When it comes to the issue of naturalisation, one statement common in political circles is very telling. It is often claimed that the Lebanese nationality is ‘a privilege not a right’. Never mind that this statement contradicts one of the national myths, Lebanon the shelter, what it conveys is that the selective admission of incomers to the confessional arrangement must be strictly managed so as not to inconvenience the prevailing order. So the idea of Lebanon’s diversity degenerates into the management of ‘undesirables’ by excluding elements that are perceived as threatening, such as the Palestinians, or ineffectual, such as the Assyrians. Those must remain as constant transients.

The vindictiveness against migrant workers is of course a manifestation of bigotry and racism at an individual and institutional levels. But it also shows how ‘strangers’ must be constantly reminded that they are transient so as not to aspire to that ‘privileged’ status of settlement and naturalisation. Lebanon created a multicultural system that is sustained at a state of ‘fragile and delicate balance’, a claim that legitimises those processes of exclusion. The Lebanese system has no vacancies. But in fact this is a recipe for instability and chronic anxiety.

Watch my immigration TedX talk 'Society Beyond Borders'

Migrants' Rights in Lebanon

2011-11-14T09:13:00.001-08:00

In response to the recent wave of arbitrary detentionsand forced evictions of migrant workers in the Bourj Hammoud, Nabaa and Dawraareas in Beirut, representatives of the migrant communities in Lebanon todayheld a press conference and issued a robust statement against the campaign of harassment launched by theLebanese security forces and army. This campaign followed a nasty report by MurrTV that blamed migrant workers for crimes and ‘moral degeneration’ in theseareas and that may have provided the incentive for the security forces tocompensate for their incompetence and failure to police these areas by unleashingthis brutal and unjustified crackdown on immigrant workers.

To my knowledge, this is the first time that such astatement was issued by the migrant workers in response to harassment, and hopefullyit is an indication that they will no longer put up with these forms of collectivepunishment and intimidation by the Lebanese state and society. There also seems to be widesupport for the workers particularly among youth in Lebanon, in a notable shiftfrom the traditional apathy, complacency and outright hostility that used to bethe norms. I firmly believe that this is one of the most important socialstruggles that we will have to fight in Lebanon in the coming years to end theshameful treatment of migrant workers.

Below are the main points of the statement, which wasissued in Arabic:

- Itcondemned the racist language and stereotyping of migrant workers by the media.

- Itmade it clear that migrant workers come to Lebanon because of the social andeconomic needs of the country that create demand for their labour, and that theyhave no interest in creating unrest.

- Itcondemned the wide scale of arbitrary arrests and the beatings and humiliationof migrant workers by security forces, and the temporary detention of legalresidents.

- Itcondemned the insults, racial epithets and the uncivilised treatment ofdetainees that violate their human rights and insult their dignity.

- It remindedthe political representatives of the local community of their moral duty toprotect the migrant workers. It also reminded them that the people theyrepresent were once in a similar position to that of the migrant workers todayand they had to struggle to overcome discrimination and marginalisation.

- Itpointed out to the local community that the migrant workers are contributingdirectly to the local economy.

- It pointedout that the Lebanese often immigrate to the countries that the migrant workerscome from, where they receive decent treatment and many go on to settle andacquire citizenship. (An option not open to migrant workers in Lebanonregardless of how long they stay in the country.)

- Itdrew attention to the constant threat of physical abuse, sexual harassment anddeprivation of wages that migrant workers constantly face, with the collusionof security forces.

- Itconfirmed the commitment of the migrant workers to acquiring their full legalrights and that they are in Lebanon to contribute to the economy and add to itscultural diversity.

Itclosed by calling upon the security forces to perform their duties and protectmigrant workers and asked Lebanese society to support them against the racistcampaign they are facing.

Letthis be the beginning of a social struggle against the injustices andhumiliation that migrant workers face in Lebanon. We don’t deserve to callourselves free if we tolerate the abuse and inhuman treatment that they have toface on a daily basis, and the periodic campaigns of harassment, intimidationand expulsion they regularly have to endure.

The Arab uprisings and the free market

2011-11-10T07:56:00.000-08:00

One interesting aspect of the Arab uprisings is how widely they have been used by people of various ideological hues and flavours to promote their own political platforms. This is understandable, the uprisings have been ideology-free, unless you buy into the theory of a secret American-Islamist conspiracy. The uprisings served as vehicles for the production of narratives that fit with their authors’ political inclinations rather than a meaningful interpretation of their internal dynamics. So depending on whom you ask, the uprisings represent the birth of a global anti-capitalist movement, the triumph of secular-liberalism or the emergence of a non-violent moderate form of Islamism.

The latest contribution in this genre is an article in the FT by the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto entitled ‘The free market secret of the Arab revolutions’. De Soto is keen to portray the Arab uprisings through his own prism of small-scale capitalism/informal economy:

‘A few weeks ago I met Salem, the younger brother of the brave Tunisian fruit vendor whose self-immolation triggered the Arab uprising. When I asked him what his brother in heaven would say if we asked what he hoped his sacrifice would bring to the Arab World, Salem did not hesitate: “That the poor also have the right to buy and sell.”’

De Soto uses this anecdote and the challenges that faced Mohamed Bouazizi of earning a living through his work as a fruit vendor to drive home his message about the need for encouraging small-scale entrepreneurs and removing the bureaucratic barriers that prevent them from expanding their business. He adds:

‘In the wake of the overthrow of three autocrats, not enough credit has been given to the mighty consensus that triggered the uprising – the desire of a vast, underclass of people to work in a legal market economy. In the culturally diverse Middle East and north Africa, the one common thread is its informal economy. This is the key to future growth and indeed stability.’

While I am strongly in favour of economic freedom and know the endless hassles that corruption and bureaucracy cause in the Arab world, I think de Soto’s reconstruction of the dynamics of the Arab uprisings is self-serving. His ‘magic formula’ of small-scale free market capitalism of market vendors belongs in the Arab past, not in a prosperous future. Street vendors aren’t ‘entrepreneurs’, they are pushed into marginal economic activities because they don’t have other options.

Furthermore, what is troubling with de Soto’s vision is that he doesn’t make a distinction between productive economic activities and peripheral and inefficient practices. Pushing a heavy fruit cart around is harsh, back-breaking manual labour and has to be one of the most backward retail methods there is. People like Bouazizi deserve a better life, not a few incentives to keep them locked into this type of labour. Not to mention that this type of selling perishables produces disproportionate amounts of waste because of the lack of refrigeration.

I agree with de Soto’s assertion about the need to tackle the causes of poverty in the Arab world, but we must do that in an ambitious and aspirational manner not by dressing up manual labour as ‘entrepreneurial activity.’ While the Arab left seems to have deluded itself into believing that redistribution alone will solve the problem of poverty, in reality countries like Egypt will need intensive economic growth to overcome the decades of decline and provide a decent life for their citizens. The free market is not a magical elixir either, we need more ambitious economic visions.

Video: Panel Debate Middle East ‘revolutions’: Hopes and Fears

2011-11-10T04:19:00.000-08:00

Video of the panel debate I participated in with Dr Maha Azzam, GhaziGheblawi and Dr GeorgeLawson and chaired by AlexHochuli at the Battle of Ideas 2011: 'Middle East 'revolutions': hopes and fears?'

The Independent has also published my accompanying article 'The paradox of the fragile revolutions'

How 'The Simpsons' inspired the 'Arab Spring'

2011-11-07T06:19:00.000-08:00

Following Julian Assange's claim last week that Wikileaks 'inspired people in the Arab world to think that they could stand up to their dictators', Amnesty International's annual report now also 'hails WikiLeaks and Guardian as Arab spring 'catalysts''. According to, er, The Guardian:

Amnesty International 'singles out WikiLeaks and the newspapers that pored over its previously confidential government files, among them the Guardian, as a catalyst in a series of uprisings against repressive regimes, notably the overthrow of Tunisia's long-serving president, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali.'

Amnesty's secretary general, Salil Shetty, gave the example of Tunisia, 'where WikiLeaks revelations about Ben Ali's corrupt regime combined with rapidly-spreading news of the self-immolation of a disillusioned young man, Mohamed Bouazizi, to spark major protests.'

On behalf of Arab people everywhere, I would like to take this opportunity to thank those esteemed Western institutions: The Guardian, Amnesty International and, above all, Wikileaks for their role in enlightening and inspiring us and acting as catalysts for our uprisings. We couldn't have possibly done it without you. And don't worry, taking credit for the Arab uprisings won't be perceived as embarrassingly self-congratulatory. On the contrary.

But I talked to the other Arabs, over a few cups of sweet tea under the palm trees, and we feel that you're ignoring the role that 'The Simpsons' has also played in fermenting revolution in Arab lands.That Lisa Simpson, she's a true inspiration. And Bart with his trickery, what a boy. And those subversive messages about 'the system', clever. It took us a while to figure them out, but once we did... I don't need to tell you the rest of the story, after all, you wrote it. So, next time, please don't forget The Simpsons.

Assange takes credit for the Arab Spring, again.

2011-11-04T03:05:00.000-07:00

Julian Assange speaking two days ago at a debate at the Frontline Club:

'‘There is, perhaps something that is interesting that is said in relation to us [Wikileaks] and the Arab Spring. And it’s that courage is contagious. And that when we stood up to the Pentagon... and we said ‘go to hell’ that that inspired people in the Arab world to think that they could stand up to their dictators. Because when they had stood up to their dictators previously, the United States had intervened in one way or another. And it was certainly a weakness. And if we could stand up to that threat, then maybe they could as well...
Perhaps there are more interesting connections, perhaps when we release so much important information about global political elites, global financial leaks all at once that that was a shock and a destabilising shock to the system. We predicted it would destabilise the middle east. I don’t know precisely whether it does, but there
must be ripple effects."

Someone should tell Assange how patronising and downright insulting that suggestion is.

Online Regulation? No, Thanks, I like my freedom.

2011-11-02T05:09:00.000-07:00

Following last week's news that the National Audiovisual Council in Lebanon is planning to ‘organise online media’ and speculation that this might include a requirement for blogs to be registered with the council, NOW Lebanon interviewed Abdel-Hadi Mahfouz the head of the council in an article published today. Mahfouz confirmed the council's proposals, including the requirement for registration:

'Mahfouz told NOW Lebanon that both news websites and blogs should register, after which details would be hammered out on how the two should be regulated in the future (i.e., whether there should be a legal distinction between them). After registering, Mahfouz said online news sites should write a code of ethics to follow and contribute to drafting a new media law that would include them.'

Given that Mahfouz is known neither for his imagination nor for his enterprising spirit, the council's initiative comes almost certainly as a result of a political decision. The improvised and arbitrary nature of this process reflects the political class's sense of lack of control of the online sector which has become increasingly irksome and feisty. Mahfouz expressed this anxiety in a typically paternalistic manner, saying that the council: 'wanted to protect, not censor, online media'. Protect from what? Critique, free thinking, inquiry? Note that this 'protection' comes with the threat of a ban if bloogers fail to comply.

It is clear that Mahfouz doesn't have the faintest clue where this is going, but wants bloggers to submit to the council's authority nevertheless. But the thing to remember here is that the council and the government behind it can cause a lot of damage despite their incompetence. Even though the threat of bans is laughable given the failure of far more authoritarian Arab regimes to implement such bans, this is a matter of principle. The principles involved are the freedom of speech and expression where there should be no compromise under any pretext.There is no shortage of laws to deal with cases of libel or defamation, any further 'organisation' can only introduce further control and prospects of censorship.

The suggestion that online news sites should write a 'code of ethics' should also be dismissed outright. This attempt at formalising self-censorship is even more dangerous than outright state censorship. We have to trust editors and writers to make independent decisions and allow them the freedom to challenge social norms and restrictions.If they transgress any limits, let public opinion be the judge not the government's officially-designated media dinosaurs. The prospect we face if we go down the route of self-censorship is irrelevant banality, an even more troubling outcome than confrontations with the censors.

Ultimately, this is about freedom. Tell the council to butt out.

عن سلطة الطوائف و طرد الأخر من برج حمود

2011-10-31T11:06:00.000-07:00

بعد تقرير المر تي في البائس و العنصري عن الشارع الممتد من برج حمود إلى الدورة و الذي حمل عنوان <أحياءفي خطر> أكد عضوتكتل "التغيير والإصلاح" النائب هاغوب بقرادونيان بداية حملة منظمة لطردالعمال الجانب من المنطقة، مدافعا عن هذا الإجراء التعسفي و مدعيا إن سكن هؤلاءالعمال هناك < أوجد مشاكل منذ مدة غير قصيرة وممارسات غير لائقة ولاأخلاقيةوبعيدة عن الآداب العامة>. ردد بقرادونيان بعض ما جاء في تقرير المر تي في من تعميمات لا منطقية وخطاب إكزينوفوبي ربط المشاكل الأمنية حصرا بتواجد العمال الأجانب في المنطقة. و الأسوأمن ذلك ان بقرادونيان كان يرد على اتهام بان بلدية برجحمود استهدفت السكان الاكراد السوريين تحديدا لتظاهرهم ضد النظام السوري، موضحابان الطرد شمل جنسيات مختلفة. لا شك أن هناك صلة وثيقة بين تقرير المحطة التي،للمفارقة، طالما اعتبرت نفسها في صفوف المدافعين عن الحريات و إجراءات الطرد التيتتم بشكل غير قانوني نظرا لأنها تمت عبر ضغوط على المالكين لعدم تجديد عقود الإيجار،لا عبر تطبيق قوانين محددة.

رغم رداءة تقرير المر تي في إلا انه عبر عن تذمر السكان يشكلواضح، لكن التدقيق النقدي بمحتوى هذا التقرير يبين فئتين مختلفتين من الشكاوى:مجموعة عبرت فقط عن تذمرها من الوضع الأمني و مجموعة أخرى أطلقت العنان لخيالها العنصري فخلطت بين المشاكل الأمنية وتواجد العمال الأجانب و من ثم إلى <مختلف أنواع الشذوذ> بلغة البرنامج الهستيريةو الأخلاقوية. لا شك إن الجانب الأمني يعود بالدرجة الأولى إلى عدم كفاءة الأجهزة الأمنيةو عدم قدرتها على ممارسة ابسط مهامها، لكن يبدو انه من الأسهل لوم العمال الأجانبو استخدام هذه اللغة المثيرة لشيطنتهم عوضا عن تسليط الضوء على هذا التقاعس الأمني.المفارقة إن تواجد العمال الأجانب في هذه المنطقة أنتج إحدى أكثر مناطق بيروت كوزموبوليتانية و أعطاها نكهة مميزة باتت تشبه أحياء أوروبية و أمريكيةتزخر بالوافدين من مختلف أنحاء العالم.

لكن المفارقة الكبرى تكمن في استهداف الوفدين في منطقة احتضنتتاريخيا الكثير من اللاجئين أبرزهم طبعا الأرمن الذين أعطوا برج حمود طابعها الخاصو أنتجوا حيويتها التجارية و الثقافية. تمثل عملية طرد العمال الأجانب من برج حمودتهجما على اندماج الأرمن في المجتمع اللبناني و محاولة لإبقاء سلطة ممثليهمالطائفيين وسيلة تخاطبهم الوحيدة مع المجتمع و الدولة اللبنانيين. فيجري تصويرعملية <التنظيف السكاني> هذه كأنهااستجابة لإرادة شعبية و تحديدا من قبل السكان الأرمن رغم أنها في الحقيقة إجراء تعسفيمن قبل سلطة تتصرف كأنها تدير إمارة طائفية لا إدارة بلدية محلية الطابع. و من المهم الالتفاتإلى أن طرد العمال الأجانب من برج حمود ليس حدثا فريدا بل يشكل جزءا من سياسات ديموغرافية تقوم الأحزاب و التيارات الطائفية بتطبيقها منخارج إطار الدولة و عبر آليات محلية من خلال البلديات التي تسيطر عليها.

ابرز مظاهر السياسات الديموغرافية هذه الاتفاق شبه المعلنبين حزب الله و التيار الوطني الحر لحد التملك العقاري الشيعي في المناطق ذات الأغلبيةالمسيحية التي يمثلها التيار انتخابيا. يمثل هذا الاتفاق، كما طرد العمال الأجانبمن مساكنهم، جزئا من ظاهرة ازدياد سلطة الطوائف على حساب سلطة الدولة و تعبيرا عنوهنها المتزايد. لكن من الخطأ حصر هذه الظاهرة بأحزاب 8 آذار فقط، فهي تشكل تعبيرااشمل عن ضعف هيكلي يصيب علاقة النظام الطائفي بالدولة و يؤدي إلى تزايد سلطةمكوناته الطائفية. عليه ينبغي التصدي لعملية الطرد هذه ليس فقط من منطلق التضامن الإنسانيمع العمال الأجانب بل أيضا لمواجهة هذا التسلط الطائفي على مقومات الدولة و خصوصاالسلطات البلدية و المحلية و استعمالها بشكل فوق قانوني.

طرد العمال الأجانبهو <حل> طائفي بامتياز، يزدري القوانين و يستند على خطاب عنصري لتبريرتجاوزات تبيحها السلطة الطائفية لنفسها. لا شك إن العديد من الذين من السكان الذينأظهرهم تقرير المرتي في عبروا عن منطق عنصري واضح تعدى مشاكل معينة إلى تعبير عن كرههم للعمال الأجانببسبب اختلافهم. لا يمكن تجاهل الرابط بين قرار طرد العمال و هذا الخطاب المتخلف والمتعصب و لا يمكن السكوت عن هذا الضرب من الاعتباطية في التصرف مع فئات تعاني أصلامن الكثير من التمييز و لا تتمتع بأدنى الحقوق المدنية. يكفي تعبيرا عن ذلك إنمعدي تقرير المر تي في لم يقابلوا شخصا واحدا من العمال أو العاملات الأجانب، و قاوموابتصويرهم من مسافة بعيدة لتجريدهم من إنسانيتهم. هذا الإقصاء الرمزي أنتج إقصاءجسدي و تعسفي لا يجب السكوت عنه.

The Paradox of the Fragile Revolutions

2011-10-30T05:57:00.000-07:00

It is perhaps a sign of these uncertain times that our perception of the Arab uprisings has been accompanied by a deep sense of anxiety. While the uprisings provided the most inspiring examples of political change we have witnessed for a long time, they have also been perceived from the beginning as fragile revolutions. This apparent contradiction fits with the wider political context that the uprisings were born into and that impacts on how outside observers and the Arab people demanding change perceive them. This is the paradox of the Arab uprisings: the apparent resurgence of political agency in an era in which the nature of that agency is understood primarily through its limitations.

Let’s be clear about the context of those uprisings. What we are witnessing is the collapse of the old order not the birth of a new one. This collapse represents the loss of legitimacy of long-standing authoritarian regimes that have become utterly vacuous. It comes as a consequence of their failure to introduce democracy and development. Simultaneously, it is indicative of the weakening of the role that they have played as part of the post-cold war American order and the decline of that regional arrangement. The collapse of the post-colonial order has revealed a political void which the various uprisings are attempting to fill, yet they appear to be unable to summon the authority to do that conclusively despite the courage exhibited by protestors in countries like Syria and Yemen.

In a manifestation of the paradoxical nature of the Arab uprisings, their three most widely celebrated aspects now prevent them from making any further progress. Those three aspects are that the uprisings are leaderless and organic, that they do not adhere to any conventional political platform and lastly that they are peaceful. While there are exceptions within the different countries, for example the Egyptian uprising was far more organised than it was assumed and Libya quickly turned into an armed rebellion, they do broadly represent common aspects of the uprisings.

Those three aspects combined represent an internal limitation and they impact on the uprisings’ chances of success and ability to dismantle the old regimes and replace them with democratic systems. The lack of strong and authoritative leaderships has weakened the uprisings’ ability to produce coherent demands and mounting serious bids for power. Nowhere is this clearer than in Syria where opposition leaders have made a virtue of their reluctance to assume control. The lack of clear political objectives and ideas has also acted as a barrier to the spread of the uprisings and to encouraging more people to join up. The lack of vision is the strongest barrier for the spread of the popular discontent, as many still perceive the uprisings as a leap in the dark. This is true of Syria as it is of several other countries that haven’t witnessed significant protest movements, as political discontent remains unarticulated. Thirdly, the emphasis on non-violence ignores the role that coercion plays in sustaining the regimes in power, a situation that will not change while the state maintains its monopoly on violence.

The ‘template’ established early on in Tunisia and Egypt gave the impression that such peaceful change is possible, but as it has become quite clear both Ben Ali and Mubarak was pushed out by the military establishments in order to preserve the status quo. Furthermore, the military’s continuing willingness to repress demonstrations violently in both countries is a clear indication of the difficulties that still lie ahead. What is happening in parallel is a form of transfer of responsibility for the uprisings epitomised by the demand ‘the world must do something’. Both in Bahrain and in Syria for example, a sense of grievance and frustration developed when this outside help failed to materialise, epitomised by the slogan ‘your silence is killing us’, revealing a mental barrier that the uprisings had prescribed for themselves. But such thinking runs contrary to the revolutionary spirit which is an expression of popular will not external agency. It is again worth emphasising that this is not because of the lack of courage but the lack of self-confidence and assertiveness for the popular uprisings to drive change autonomously.

Against this backdrop and the protracted stalemates that appear to be prevailing, recent developments are being misinterpreted to cast doubts on the legitimacy of the uprisings and the genuine popular will for change that drives them. The recent Islamist victory in the Tunisian elections, the vacuous speech that the NTC leader gave on liberation day with its ‘Islamic tinge’, and the attacks on the Coptic rally in Cairo are perceived as derailments of the uprisings. They have been seen as signs either of the hidden hand of the Islamists or in some instances interpreted, absurdly, as evidence of collusion between the West and Islamists. Such interpretations are nonsensical and they fail to understand the dynamics of the uprisings. In one way or another, all are symptoms of the failure of the uprisings to produce a coherent narrative and to take control of fluid transitional situations.

It is likely that in the absence of the political clarity and the competent leaderships emerging, the uprisings will carry on at a slow and protracted pace and they will face many setbacks along the way. What we are witnessing is a failure to transform the ‘raw revolutionary matter’, the individual sacrifices and acts of bravery, into a political force for change. What is urgently needed to put the uprisings on the right track is a realisation that acts of revolutionary change can only be meaningful if carried out autonomously and in pursuit of self-determination. It is time to claim back the responsibility for the uprisings.

Thoughts from a panel debate 'Middle East 'revolutions': hopes and fears?' at the Battle of Ideas.

The Arab Dictator Halloween Style Guide

2011-10-27T05:03:00.000-07:00

Why not celebrate Halloween in thematic style this year and commemorate the Arab Spring? We’ve put together a list of suggested dictator outfits that could be easily assembled with tips on making the right choice for you. We also provided a handy rating system for glamour and difficulty levels.

Ali Abdullah Saleh

Yemen’s president is one of the least glamorous Arab dictators and is a bad choice. He used to wear dark suits before the explosion that claimed half of his ear and left him badly burnt, but started dressing in more traditional attire since. This phase of his career is more suitable for Halloween but might be a bit in bad taste.

Difficulty: 3/5 Glamour 2:/5

Mubarak

Egypt’s former number one honcho was given to very expensive suits, he hasn’t been seen in a military uniform for decades. The expensively-tailored suits that incorporate his name in the pinstripe are a trademark, but they are naturally hard to come by. You could go for the pajamas-in-a-cell look he adopted of late, but that requires elaborate props. Nevertheless, if you manage to pull it off, you will feel very pleased. But please avoid the nose-picking.

Difficulty: 5/5 Glamour 3/5

Omar Al-Bashir

Sudan’s reigning ex-military man is not unimaginative when it comes to his dress sense. He frequently alternates between military uniforms and traditional Sudanese clothes. Either would be a good choice, although the latter is probably easier to procure. If you opt for the military style, it’s all about the right hat. Al-Bashir likes them big and flashy, and the same applies to his military decorations. Go for bright colours and don’t be afraid to experiment with unconventional combinations.

Difficulty: 4/5 Glamour 4/5

Saddam Hussein

Iraq’s former strongman has been a long-time party favourite. The ‘classic’ Saddam is the beret and dark-green military uniform, with an over-sized moustache as the main feature. However, Saddam’s other looks, such as ‘the Don Corleone’ and the ‘Soviet dictator’ (a bit self–referential and ironic), are more inventive and original. Cigars and replica guns are essential, and you might want to spend some time in front of the mirror perfecting his trademark chuckle.

Difficulty: 3/5 Glamour 4/5

Colonel Gaddafi

Libya’s recently departed Big Brother undoubtedly represents the holy grail of Halloween costumes. Not only are his outfits visually rich and varied, they are also easy to replicate. One word: curtains. Preferably from the 70s or the 80s. Failing that, old bed sheets. But that’s not all, alone among Arab dictators Gaddafi understood the importance of accessories. Be bold and go for visual non sequiturs: large pictures, cardboard cut-outs of the African continent and over-sized rings. And spend some time on the hats.

Difficulty: 1/5 Glamour 5/5

Bashar Al-Assad

I don’t know what you're talking about.

The Looming Threat of Online Censorship in Lebanon

2011-10-26T11:43:00.000-07:00

I read this Daily Star story about Lebanon’s plan to ‘organise online media’ with a combination of alarm and amusement. I am alarmed by the censorship role that the National Audiovisual Council has been playing increasingly in recent years, but I am also amused by the incompetent authoritarianism of the Lebanese political class and its fumbling efforts to control the dynamic online scene. I should stress that this is not a characteristic that is unique to this government but is something that it shares with the previous March 14 cabinets.

It’s likely that most online users, bloggers and activists will ignore this latest initiative by the archaic NAC and treat it as the irrelevance that it is perceived to be. However, this creeping censorship role should be taken more seriously and opposed widely. While such battles with authority may not sound as glamorous as the Arab uprisings, it is important to defend the relative freedom of expression and speech that exist in Lebanon. It is also important to oppose such measures as that proposed by the NAC, requiring all Lebanese websites to register with the council for example at the risk of facing a ban, on principled grounds and not on fickle and instrumental grounds.

Worryingly, two of the online editors that the Daily Star interviewed seemed to be quite accommodating of the new measure. The editors of both Al-Nashra and LebanonFiles seemed to be in favour of an online media law in principle, even if they had some minor squabbles with the nature of that law. Moreover, the editor of Al-Nashra seemed to be preaching the value of self-censorship and arguing that his publication has established its own ethics: ‘we avoid writing pieces on religion, children, or sects’. This is a common attitude in Lebanon, believing self-censorship to be the lesser of two evils. In fact, self-censorship is even worse than government censorship and it operates more insidiously.

Ayman Mehanna, from the Samir Kassir Eyes Foundation, rightly pointed out that the council ‘cannot impose regulations on online media with laws that were passed in 1994’. But there is more to be debated here than the need for more modern laws to regulate online publishing. It is the question of whether such regulation is needed at all. Online content is not exempt from the general media laws in Lebanon, but any further formal regulation will only serve as an instrument of control and censorship. There is already a growing tendency for security agencies to act in response to online content, and that trend should be reversed not formalised.

While freedom of the press remains strong in Lebanon despite the attempts of various regimes to control it, there is no doubt that online publishing has led to the emergence of many new voices that would have struggled to be heard otherwise, in the process forcing traditional media outlets to raise their standards. I would argue that the strength of the online publishing scene in Lebanon lies in its unregulated and free-for-all nature and that government ‘organisation’ can only harm that. Naturally this means tolerating a lot of mediocrity and, in the case of the Beirut Observer, outrageous fabrications, but it’s the only process that guarantees a free and dynamic exchange of ideas. To that end, we must oppose the NAC’s ludicrous propositions.

If you would like to be updated about posts on this blog and other articles I publish, follow me on Twitter.

My Comment on Gaddafi's killing for RT

2011-10-25T02:38:00.000-07:00

Watch the interview that I did with RT about Gaddafi's killing and what the near future holds for Libya.

A diagram of Lebanon's War and Peace

2011-10-21T09:23:00.000-07:00

The diagram maps the conflicts and shifting alliances of Lebanon's civil war and the post-war period, up to the present day. The way the diagram works is it traces which side each party was on and when it shifted direction along a line from 1975 to the present.It also maps the alliances and conflicts along the way, often between parties on the same side. The dividing line represents the major political camps over the past three and a half decades, although that is not necessarily how everyone understands them.

The diagram is still work in progress and is missing many details so comments are welcome, both on form and content. Parties like Al-Morabitoun, Islalmic Amal, and Elie hobeika's Al Wa'ad, among several others, are not yet represented. I have taken some license in representing the FPM, associating it with its leader even though that's not exactly accurate. I have left out the Palestinian organisations, Syria and Israel for now as I try to work out how to place them without biasing the diagram. Again suggestions welcome. Click on the image for a larger version.

Thanks to Lina Abou Rislan for designing the diagram.

The Wall Street image the media doesn't want you to see? Fake!

2011-10-07T09:43:00.000-07:00

The image above has been doing the rounds on social media, with many claiming that there is a conspiracy to keep the world from seeing it. It allegedly shows a huge Occupy Wall Street demonstration near the Woolworth Building in New York. Some have even talked of the 'photographer' being harassed. Now this would be very entertaining if it's wasn't so sad that many intelligent people are falling for an obviously doctored photograph. Not only it's doctored, there's no photographer because it's taken from Google Maps. Here's the link for the image as it appears now on Google, and you can see that the same picture (above) has been doctored to show thousands of people on the street.

The people who edited the photograph didn't even bother to change the cars that appear on the original and they copied the pattern made from the people over and over again. What's really sad is some people's belief in conspiracy theories is so strong that they uncritically accept amateurishly edited photographs like that as a sign of a conspiracy to conceal a demonstration with thousands of people. It's New York for God's sake!

I'm sure someone will say that while the photograph is not authentic, it does reveal an 'emotional truth'...

TEDxEastEnd Talk: Re-imagining cities in a world without borders

2011-09-27T10:01:00.001-07:00

This is the talk that I gave two weeks ago as part of TedX East End 'Society Beyond Borders'

الانتفاضات العربية: بين سجن الهوية و استجداء الرعاية

2011-09-22T07:51:00.000-07:00

شاءت الأقدار أن تندلعالانتفاضات العربية خلال فترة من الضياع الفكري و زمن اندحار الأفكار السياسية والفلسفية الكبرى التي شكلت إطار النقاش العام خلال القرن الماضي. غير أن احتفاء الكثيرينبعفوية الانتفاضات العربية و عدم تبنيها لأطر عقائدية و تنظيمية محددة ما لبث أن اصطدمبعدم قدرة هذه الانتفاضات على حزم الأمور لصالحها رغم الوهن الذي أصاب معظمالأنظمة و فقدانها الشرعية و الهيبة. أكثر ما يعبر عن حالة الضياع الفكري و السياسي تلك هو عدم تبلور موقف منسجم وواضح من موضوع التدخل الغربي. من جهة هناك مريدي الحداثة و الاتصال بالغرب الذينيبدون الحماسة للتدخل بل و يعتبرون أن التدخل الغربي هو مسؤولية أخلاقية. و فيالجهة الأخرى هناك أسرى منطق الهوية الذين يعتبرون إن كل ما يأتي من الغرب هو ملوثو مشبوه فيأخذ رفضهم للتدخل الغربي شكل الدفاع عن خصوصيات ثقافية عوض أن يكونموقفا مبدئيا.

المأزق الذي نواجهه نتيجةلهذا الانقسام يضعنا إمام خيارين سيئين: إما أن نقبل و نعيش منطق الضحية التيتستجدي العطف و العون و يصبح مصيرها رهنا بمشيئة "المجتمع الدولي" و إماأن نتقبل منطق نظرية المؤامرة الذي يشكل هو الأخر استسلاما فكريا يعبر عن عدمقدرتنا على إنتاج خطاب تأويلي و سياسي واضح لأوضاعنا و علاقاتنا بالعالم. كلا هذينالخيارين لهما دعاتهما و أنصارهما وإن كانت الحدود بينهما مطاطة و غامضة، فنجد أنفسناننتقل من ضفة إلى أخرى طبقا للحالة التي نناقشها. المسالة أن كلا الخيارين يعنياالتخلي عن قدرتنا على تحديد مصيرنا بقدراتنا الذاتية و يشكلا عوائق نحو أخذنالزمام الأمور و تدبير أحوالنا على ما نراه صوابا.

الفكرة الأساسية هنا حقتقرير المصير. لا معنى لأية ثورة أو انتفاضة إن لم تكن تعبيرا عن هذا الطموح الإنساني الأساسي.راج مؤخرا شعار "صمتكم يقتلنا" تأييدا للانتفاضة السورية و اعتبر سبيلاللضغط على المجتمع الدولي لكي يتحرك نجدةللشعب السوري. في زمن آخر كان هذا الشعار سيعتبر استجداء للعطف فيه الكثير منالابتزاز المعنوي و الحط من قدرة الشعب السوري على النضال بشكل مستقل. لكن في زمن الإفلاسالفكري الذي نعيشه يصبح هذا الاستجداء مقبولا. لا مفر من الاعتراف بان القدرة علىلعب دور الضحية أضحت مرادفة لشرعية النضال السياسي.

لكن هذا التطور يشكل انقلابخطير على مفهوم التحرر الذي ارتبط لزمن طويل بمفهوم واضح للنضال المباشر و قدرةالمجموعات و الأمم على انتزاع حقوقها بنفسها و بإراداتها الذاتية. لا احد يدافع عنهذا المنطق اليوم. لقد تم التخلي بشكل شبه كامل عن مفهوم الذات المستقلة الفاعلة.المفارقة المأسوية بالنسبة للانتفاضات العربية أن تتزامن شراراتها مع هذا التحولالفلسفي الذي استبدل صورة المناضل بصورة الضحية. إن شئنا أن نفهم العقبة التيتعترض الانتفاضات العربية اليوم علينا أن نعي خطورة هذا الانقلاب و مفاعيله. وتاليا علينا إعادة اكتشاف الفكر التحرري بشكله الأوسع.

نعود هنا إلى مأزقالهوية: أدى فشل الأفكار الحداثية عالميا و الذي تزامن مع نهاية الحرب الباردة إلىرواج مفاهيم الانتماء و الهويات الثقافية. العودة إلى العروبة و الهوية العربية اليوم لا علاقة لها بما مثلته العروبة في عصر التحرر،على العكس أصبحت شكلا من أشكال الدفاع عن الخصوصيات ثقافية. أدى ذلك، في ما أدى، إلىوهن العلاقة بمفاهيم التحرر الواسعة و التي لطالما استمدت أفكارها من ارث التنويرو نتاجه الفكري الذي، شئنا أم أبينا، انطلق من الغرب. لم تمنع هذه النشأة الغربيةللفكر التحرري من التمدد بطموح كوني لكي يعم بشكل واسع و يصبح مصدر الوحي لحركاتالتحرر. لكن التفاؤل الذي طبع تلك المرحلة تبدد تحت وطأة هزائم و خيبات متتالية.

لكن دعاة الهوية اليوم ينحوننحو رفض النتاج الفكري الغربي بوصفه نوعا من الهيمنة المعرفية. وهنا يشتد المأزقالذي نواجهه اليوم في رفضنا للتدخل الخارجي: من يرفض هذا التدخل تحكمه عدائية غير عقلانيةللغرب بمجمله و يعجز عن التمييز بين الأفكار التحررية و الأنظمة الغربية التي قطعالا تمثل هذا الفكر. المفارقة أن من يؤيدون التدخل يعانون من الالتباس نفسه فيعتبرونأن استنجاد التدخل الغربي هو امتداد لتوقهم إلى الاتصال بالحداثة.

اتجاهان خاطئان و تناقضملتبس. عندما اعترض على التدخل الغربي لا اعتبر ذلك عداءا حضاريا للغرب، على العكسهو اقتناع بقيم إنسانية و كونية نشا الكثير منها في الغرب. عندما أدافع عن حقتقرير المصير لا أجد أفضل من جون ستيوارت ميل كأساس فلسفي مثلا. علينا أن نعي أنالخيار الذي يقدم لنا هو خيار زائف: نحن لا نختار بين معاداة الغرب أو مهادنته بل ندافععن حق تقرير المصير الذي يجب أن يشكل صلب أية انتفاضة. الخيار بين لعب دور الضحيةو سجن الهوية هو خيار بين نوعين مختلفين من إلغاء الذات الثورية.

Gaddafi’s (near) Downfall: An unfortunate boost for liberal interventionism

2011-08-22T05:48:00.000-07:00

As the news of the Libyan rebels’ takeover of Tripoli started to spread last night, it quickly became apparent that this development was being interpreted primarily as a vindication of the interventionist camp. As the situation in Libya appeared to be heading towards a stalemate over the past few months, several voices had started to question the wisdom of NATO's military intervention there. The fickle and unprincipled nature of this circumstantial anti-interventionism was no match for the triumphalism of the other side, even before the situation on the ground was properly understood. Worryingly, this ‘success’ seems to have already energised advocates of intervention, as speculation started about where the West could intervene next.

In the heat of the moment, the main argument for intervention in Libya, protecting civilian lives, was forgotten. Gaddafi’s hordes, the Viagra-and-drugs-fuelled mob that was going to butcher thousands in Benghazi, were nowhere to be seen as Tripoli fell with remarkable speed while offering very little resistance. It might sound banal to repeat that the intervention was about regime change all along, but it’s important to remember that point as the question of legitimacy surfaces in the wake of Gaddafi’s anticipated downfall. NATO had effectively interfered to tip the balance in favour of the Transitional National Council (TNC), an unaccountable entity that has a large number of former Gaddafi associates and that has behaved in a far from exemplary fashion so far.

Those keen to differentiate between the intervention in Libya and those in Iraq and Afghanistan are ignoring the lessons learned there, where US financial and military support created and maintained parasitical and corrupt leaderships. While the Libyan people might still surprise us and tip the situation back in their favour, they will now have to fight against an internationally-recognised and supported clique of former Gaddafi cronies. The balance of power in this contest is already distorted by the West’s actions.

Furthermore, the model of intervention practised in Libya harks back to NATO's 'good war' in Serbia and implies a departure from the mistakes of Afghanistan and Iraq. This will undoubtedly give a boost to further interventions elsewhere. The ‘no boots on the ground’ philosophy avoids fatalities among Western soldiers but it clearly highlights NATO's main contribution: its huge destructive power which is shamefully described as ‘surgical’. This revived interventionist model is even more barbaric than its predecessor, promoting the myth that real political change can be achieved through remote-controlled military aggression. The likes of Obama, Cameron and Sarkozy are seizing the opportunity to bolster their weak standing at home through this ‘success’, reviving in the process the notion that the West has the moral responsibility to intervene where it sees fit.

The interventionist chatter has intensified since yesterday, with arguments such as ‘this wouldn’t have been possible without NATO intervention’. While I will personally be pleased to see Gaddafi end his despicable reign, the simple answer is we will never know now. We will also never know which shape the Libyan uprising would have taken and whether it would have allowed a different leadership untainted with its association to the old regime to emerge. In short, the right to self-determination has been taken away from the Libyan people, and that is not a small matter. Anyone still convinced of the humanitarian merit of the intervention should closely examine how the events unfolded on the ground in Libya to realise the extent to which this argument has been substantiated through exaggeration and the spreading of convenient myths.

The momentum that the argument for intervention built back in March, largely due to the influence of Britain and France, was enough to overcome US reluctance even in the absence of clear Western interests. By convincing themselves that they are morally obliged to intervene, Western leaders end up acting in an irrational manner and get swept up by their own rhetoric. It is now crucial to confront the insidious logic of liberal interventionism and defend the right to self-determination. While the jubilation we might feel when Gaddafi finally departs might convince us it was ‘worth it’, the reality is it’s misguided to replace one local tyrant with the custodianship of superpowers. Let the lesson of Iraq not be forgotten.

If you would like to be updated about posts on this blog and other articles I publish, follow me on Twitter.

On the consumption of atrocity media

2011-08-12T08:31:00.000-07:00

When it comes to the Arab uprisings, there's a school of thought that equates atrocities with lack of legitimacy. A regime is repressive even if not outwardly violent. Hence I don't see the need for consumption of atrocity media. You're either for or against on principle, not in proportion to the violence.

Zeid Hamdan and General Suleiman: The Authoritarianism of Fragile Egos

2011-07-27T07:11:00.000-07:00

Message from Zeid Hamdan in prison: 'Dear friends, I am now in the prison of the police station of the palace of justice in Beirut because of my song "General Soleiman". They are prosecuting me for defammation of President Soleiman. I dont know, until when I am staying in prison. Please mobilize!'

The Lebanese musician Zeid Hamdan, recently back from participating in the Shubbak Festival in London, sent this message from his detention cell in Beirut earlier today. Shubbak was intended as a 'window on contemporary Arab culture', the bitter irony is that this incident has now given an all too realistic view of the contemporary culture of repression and arbitrary use of power in Lebanon. The song in question, General Suleiman, is a light-hearted reggae number that has has provoked the humourless authorities to go after Zeid Hamdan, in all likelihood for the 'offence' of demeaning the position of the President of the Republic. This archaic residue of the French mandate period has often been used by the authorities to clamp down on the freedom of expression.

Last year I reviewed General Suleiman, and I may have been too harsh on the borrowed imagery in the video clip and the soft satire it employed. Zeid explained at the time that the idea for the song came out of the political frustrations of the power vacuum that the country experienced, and how he saw the election of General Suleiman as a positive step. The song is in fact a plea for change, for stability, for normalcy. As a result of the authorities' incompetence, lack of humour and heavy-handedness, perhaps it will now spark a genuine drive for change. The reaction to the detention has been swift, the news travelled very quickly and protest will hopefully follow very soon.

While it's tempting to defend Zeid on the basis that the song isn't actually offensive, I think this is the wrong approach. What we need to defend here is the freedom of expression, without qualifications, and push for abolishing the archaic laws that provide the legal basis for such arrests. No politician or public figure should be beyond critique, and they shouldn't be allowed to use those laws in a desperate bid to gain the respect that their political record hasn't gained them. The role of art and music isn't to flatter the fragile egos of insecure public figures. Let's say a resolute no to these forms of intellectual intimidation and fight for our freedom to offend the clique of fools that is ruling us.

Join the Free Zeid page on facebook.

Update: It has now been confirmed that Zeid was freed from detention earlier. It's still not clear who ordered the arrest amid denials from official agencies. The law that punishing criticism of the president is being arbitrarily expanded to apply to the internet allowing cases like Zeid's to happen. Abolishing this law and stopping it from being used to police the internet should be a priority for those who want to defend the freedom of expression in Lebanon.

If you would like to be updated about posts on this blog and other articles I publish, follow me on Twitter.

What's Happening to Beirut's Grand Theatre?

2011-07-27T05:45:00.000-07:00

There's been a lot of speculation recently about the fate of one of downtown Beirut's historic buildings, the Grand Theatre, a 1930s cultural icon that has been abandoned since the end of the civil war in 1990. The recent demolition of a section of the Grand Theatre complex was perceived by many as a prelude to the demolition of the entire building, and rumours about this spread online very quickly. This came as a surprise to me as Solidere, the private development company in charge of the reconstruction of Beirut's city centre, had confirmed in 2009 that the theatre building was going to be restored and converted into a boutique hotel. The British architectural firm Rogers Stirk Harbour had won the commission to design the hotel following an international design competition.

I decided to find out whether those plans have changed and if the Grand Theatre was now considered for demolition. As it turns out the allegations are not true, the original plan to convert the Grand Theatre into a boutique hotel are still being developed by Rogers & Partners. I managed to obtain an image of their proposal (see above) which clearly shows that the distinctive historic façades will be retained in the new scheme. The part of the building that was demolished recently was a later addition that was structurally unsound and was clearly not in keeping with the character of the Grand Theatre.

Some of the blame for the misinformation lies with Solidere, its communication strategy is very poor and has contributed to increasing speculation about this and other projects in the city centre. Solidere's heavy-handed policing of the downtown area and its strict prohibitions on photography there lead to unacceptable incidents like what happened to the journalist Habib Battah when he tried to take photographs of the wing that was being demolished. Treating Beirut's downtown as a private development will increase the detachment that most Lebanese people feel towards the city centre, and most feel that Solidere's army of private security is one of most off-putting factors.

But Lebanon's emerging heritage lobby is also to blame, it has frequently engaged in spreading false information and relied on wild exaggeration to promote its message. The main heritage group on Facebook is Save Beirut Heritage, which has about 8000 members and plays a significant role in the preservation lobby. The rumours about the demolition of the Grand Theatre first appeared there as far as it appears, together with allegations that there's a Lebanese architect responsible for the demolition. Both stories are obviously false, but don't expect any retractions from the self-righteous people running the group any time soon.

By maintaining the external façades, RSH's designs for the Grand Theatre will maintain the building's relationship with the urban context and preserve its distinctive appearance.It appears that the internal design is also sensitive to the spatial qualities of the theatre building, although I haven't managed to obtain any images of this so far. Of course it's legitimate to ask whether the Grand Theatre should be converted to a hotel instead of being renovated for the purpose it was originally designed for. The scarcity of adaptive reuse projects in Lebanon contributes to the aversion towards the conversion of cultural buildings, but I don't personally find such projects problematic.

There's a wider debate that we never properly had about the reconstruction of the city centre, but altering Solidere's mandate will require a clear political and urban vision and significant financial commitments that we can't be flippant about. If the alternative on offer is the heritage lobby's nostalgic and naive fantasy of historic preservation, then we stand little chance of coming up with any creative and original ideas. A good starting point is to think what kind of city we aspire to have, not be obsessed with preserving all that we inherited.

Note: In the spirit of our transparent times I will mention that I have participated in the design of three buildings in the BCD.

If you would like to be updated about posts on this blog and other articles I publish, follow me on Twitter.

A Premier League Guide to Lebanese Politics.

2011-07-08T08:46:00.000-07:00

Lebanese politics can appear confusing to the outside observer. Indeed, most of the time, it appears confusing to the inside observer. However, Lebanese politics has inherent logic and rules and, once those are grasped, following it can offer hours of entertainment for the whole family. In an effort to demystify some of the conceptual and technical aspects of Lebanese politics, I offer you the Premier League Guide to Lebanese Politics. It’s a handy metaphorical guide that will help you tell the difference between a Jumblatt and an Aoun, and answer questions like why they can never be on the same side.

But what do Lebanese politics and the English Premier League have in common, I hear you ask? Simple, it’s all about the relaxed rules about foreign ownership and player transfers. Like the Premier League, most parties in Lebanon are financed by foreign owners who are mostly connoisseurs that invest heavily in their hobby. Lebanese politicians are very pragmatic about their affiliations, and can often be convinced to switch sides. Lebanese politics is also divided into competition seasons and periods of rest during players assess their performance and the tourists are allowed to come for the summer.

So let’s find who’s who in Lebanese politics:

Hezbollah: Hezbollah are the Manchester United of Lebanese politics. They were around for a while, but didn’t become really successful until they found the right manager, their own Alex Ferguson. Under his leadership, they acquired a winning touch and they’ve done very well since he took the helm. Many others are jealous of their successes and want to end their dominance. Like Man U, their fans don’t like Americans.

The Future Movement: Future are the ‘blues’ of Lebanese politics. They also are bankrolled by a tycoon and have had some success in recent years, but not enough to meet their expectations. They’ve managed to lure players from other teams often, but they haven’t all been good signings. They also experimented with young and inexperienced managers.

The Lebanese Forces: The Lebanese Forces are the Liverpool of Lebanese politics. They were successful in the 80s, but then they spent years in the shadows. Like Liverpool, they brought back their manager from the 80s in hope of finding the winning formula. He spent years away from the game for personal reasons.

The Free Patriotic Movement: Had Blackpool not been relegated, it would have been the perfect equivalent of the FPM. Both like the colour orange and both are led by loud-mouthed, hot-headed individuals who seem to speak their own language. Both Blackpool and the FPM have bigger ambitions than their resources and skills merit. However, since Blackpool were relegated last season, this analogy doesn’t actually work.

Walid Jumblatt: Walid Jumblatt is the ‘libero’ of Lebanese politics. He has a classic sweeper’s ability to ‘read the game’ and anticipate the opponent’s movements. His own movements are impossible to predict. Like Ashly Cole, he has switched sides between red and blue teams, but he doesn’t have Cole’s commitment and sense of loyalty.

The National Bloc: Arsenal. Both are led by men who are more comfortable when speaking French and nobody takes either seriously.

A Second part will follow soon. Help complete the guide and send your own suggestions.

If you would like to be updated about posts on this blog and other articles I publish, follow me on Twitter.

The Folly of March 14’s STL Gamble.

2011-07-05T04:47:00.000-07:00

As the first day of parliamentary talks kicks off in Lebanon ahead of a vote of confidence in the new cabinet, the March 14 coalition began its first real stint in opposition. There were no surprises as its MPs took to the platform, the coalition had already announced that the government’s commitment to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) was going to be at the heart of its opposition to the ministerial policy statement. Despite the significant local, regional, and international shifts, March 14 seems to be intent on pursuing the tribunal as a central political goal. To complicate matters further, the new opposition is resurrecting the debate about disarming Hezbollah in conjunction with the discussion about the STL stance. This is an unwise move, March 14 is missing a chance to reenergise itself and find a renewed sense of purpose.

While the new PM Najib Mikati appeared to be making the ‘right’ noises about the STL, his statements were quickly contradicted by his political ally Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in his speech on Saturday night, as he insisted that the party would never surrender the four suspects that were named in the STL indictment. Furthermore, while Mikati insisted that the policy statement shows the government’s commitment to the STL, in fact it’s a semantic contraption designed to avoid clarity. Article 14 of the statement includes the ambiguous promise that the government ‘will follow the path of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’. ‘Follow’ in Arabic leans more toward ‘observe’ than ‘pursue,’ hence the ambiguity.

While March 14 is right in its insistence on discovering the truth about Rafik Hariri’s assassination, it has placed too much faith in the STL and ‘international justice’ in pursuing this goal. The STL indictment confirmed what most people already knew, it pointed out the alleged operatives but refrained from naming the political decision makers and the leaders who gave the orders. This is a strong indication that the STL and the international community behind it, read the US, have imposed a clear ceiling for the tribunal’s investigation. March 14 seems to be still too dependent on international justice to understand the significance of this limitation.

Furthermore, March 14 itself had placed another ceiling on the tribunal's work when Saad Hariri publicly absolved Syria of any role in the assassination. With Syria out of the picture, the most that the tribunal can deliver is a confrontation with Hezbollah that it can't possibly win, especially with the West, thankfully, unwilling to intervene. Those who claim that the US needs a pretext to pounce and punish Hezbollah ignore the events of 7 May 2008 when March 14 was left to face the music on its own and was quickly defeated. It still seems that Walid Jumblatt was the only one to understand the consequences of Hezbollah breaking its promise to use its weapons internally on that occasion. His subsequent u-turn was a direct result of this, turning the most enthusiastic supporter of the mythical 'new Middle East' into a middle-of-the-road pragmatist.

The remnants of March 14 however seem intent on gambling on the STL. But this weakens their legitimate demand for Hezbollah to disarm as it seems to envision the STL as mechanism for achieving that. Even if the West was willing to actively pursue this, the likely outcome would be another protracted civil war. While the threat of Hezbollah’s weapons shouldn’t be a reason not to pursue justice, March 14 could have convincingly defended this process had it been conducted by a reformed Lebanese justice system but cannot do so while the specter of international interventions is what it’s hoping for.

With its current stance, March 14 is missing a chance to pin its hopes on the Lebanese people rather than on external intervention. For starters, it’s facing a weak cabinet that appears to be lacking in purpose and is already showing signs of wear and tear. It could have, and indeed could still, play a successful role in opposition relentlessly attacking the cabinet and subjecting its policies to scrutiny. In the process, it could formulate a political vision that eventually brings it back to power, away from its reliance on fickle external agents. This would help resurrect Lebanese politics as well, and banish the demon of lowest common denominator governments.

But I’m not holding my breath.

If you would like to be updated about posts on this blog and other articles I publish, follow me on Twitter.

Nasrallah's Reaction to the STL Indictment

2011-07-02T17:01:00.000-07:00

Hassan Nasrallah’s speech about the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s (STL) indictment was a spectacular display of political theatre. We have become accustomed to the Hezbollah leader’s master performances, and today he did not disappoint. The speech had all the usual ingredients: criminal evidence, intricate conspiracies, and a defiant but reasoned political message. It seems that Nasrallah is pinning his hopes on winning the public opinion battle by undermining the credibility of the STL and dissuading his opponents in March 14 from pursuing its agenda.

Nasrallah is definitely on charm offensive that he has the charisma and stature to win. But like every single time he addresses the STL, I find myself asking the same questions: why is Nasrallah resorting to the cloak-and-dagger approach? Why not stick to a principled political argument against the STL? The truth of the matter is that despite the politically formidable image that Hezbollah has created, it has become an organisation far more concerned with winning PR skirmishes than playing a leading role in Lebanese politics.

Nasrallah is ultimately trying to publicly manage the STL issue rather than address the root political causes that brought it into being. The political disorientation that prevails in Lebanon means that almost everyone is drawn into Nasrallah’s seductive logic, whether they agree with him or not. Instead of addressing the political questions we find ourselves yet again playing the role of CSI investigators, in a very stark display of how vacuous Lebanese politics has become. And the trend is set to continue.

So what is the problem with the STL? The tribunal was set up as a substitute for Lebanon’s weak and ineffectual judicial system. Its mission is to uncover the truth about the assassination of Rafik Hariri and prosecute those involved, tasks that were beyond the reach of the local justice system. March 14’s support for the tribunal was premised on the continuing involvement of the ‘international community’, leading up to the arrest and trial of those involved. Lebanon traded its sovereignty in return for this mandate and the desire of justice, which in all truth was more about political revenge than justice itself.

Yet, since the STL was established, neither Hezbollah nor any of its allies ever confronted the tribunal using the sovereignty argument. Occasionally, journalists and commentators sympathetic to March 8 unpicked ‘technical’ items in the tribunal’s charter that were seen as encroaching on Lebanon’s sovereignty. But the blatantly obvious fact that the STL represented a form of international custody of a feeble country was not challenged. All sides seemed to agree that Lebanon’s judicial system is not to be trusted, but none thought that reforming it was an urgent task. It’s telling that even now when Hezbollah and its allies are in power, they are not suggesting that the case be handed back to a reformed Lebanese judicial system.

Instead, Nasrallah tonight offered a convenient narrative: let’s agree that Israel was the culprit and move on. Those who are pouring over the ‘evidence’ are missing the point, it’s not meant to withstand scrutiny. Its value lies in its expediency; it represents a face-saving way out for all involved. But the division over the STL in Lebanon is too deep to be bridged by this gesture. There are those who rightly want to find out the truth, but their confidence in the STL is misplaced. On the other hand, there are those who argue that Hariri’s death isn’t more important than thousands of others and it doesn’t merit all this effort to uncover the killers. Both sides seem to see Lebanon as a crippled nation incapable of solving its own problems and dealing with its past. The resistance may have ‘never been stronger’, but Lebanon has never been more divided.

For background information on the STL and the Hariri assassination, read my article on the subject.

If you would like to be updated about posts on this blog and other articles I publish, follow me on Twitter.

Lebanon's Ministerial Policy Statement -STL article

2011-07-01T04:55:00.000-07:00

The most contentious item in the new cabinet's policy statement is undoubtedly the one dealing with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. As-Safir newspaper has published a leaked copy of the full text in Arabic. I couldn't find an English translation, below is my own attempt at translating it myself. The paragraph is intentionally vague in Arabic, I hope I managed in capturing the exact tone. As I argued yesterday, PM Mikati is trying to perform a delicate balancing act between internal and external pressure with respect to the STL, an attitude clearly reflected in the leaked statement.

Your comments on the translation are welcome:

'The government out of respect for international resolutions, affirms its commitment to revealing the truth about the assassination of the martyred Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and his companions, and it will follow the process of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon which was established principally to achieve truth and justice away from any politicization or revenge, and without negative impact on Lebanon's stability, unity and civil peace.'

And here's the Arabic version:

'ـ ان الحكومة انطلاقاً من احترامها القرارات الدولية، تؤكد حرصها على جلاء الحقيقة وتبيانها في جريمة اغتيال الرئيس الشهيد رفيق الحريري ورفاقه، وستتابع مسار المحكمة الخاصة بلبنان التي انشئت مبدئياً لإحقاق الحق والعدالة بعيداً عن أي تسييس او انتقام وبما لا ينعكس سلباً على استقرار لبنان ووحدته وسلمه الأهلي. '

‘The Indictment’: A Thriller lacking in action. The STL Predicament

2011-06-30T07:00:00.000-07:00

So we finally have it. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s (STL) indictment in the Hariri murder case has been handed to the Lebanese General Prosecutor Sa’id Mirza. Although the indictment itself has not been made public yet, its contents have been widely leaked in keeping with the STL’s shoddy record. The indictment reportedly names four suspects implicated in the assassination, all members of Hezbollah. The General Prosecutor has thirty days to arrest the suspects before the indictment is made public. The STL’s fondness for delayed gratification is exemplary, an attitude that seems to be shared by Lebanese politicians now. The responses to the indictment so far have been largely evasive, reflecting a lack of eagerness to bring things to a conclusion. Inaction will be the main headline for the foreseeable future.

Let’s examine the signs. Firstly, the indictment was handed over while the new cabinet was finalising its ministerial policy statement. The cabinet didn’t seem rattled by this, and subsequently adopted the policy statement maintaining Lebanon’s commitment to the ‘functioning of the STL’ and ‘respecting international resolutions.’ According to one news source, there is a proviso that protects ‘Lebanon’s unity and stability.’ A similar sentiment was expressed by PM Najib Mikati in his speech, saying ‘we will prove those who thought the STL indictment would divide Lebanon and the Lebanese wrong.’ This evidently evasive action by the cabinet reflects its lack of willingness to resolve the STL issue or take any meaningful action about it.

Mikati’s balancing act between the demands of the ‘international community’ and his March 8 partners seems to have been made easier by Hezbollah’s reluctance to pressure for stronger action against the STL. In fact, Hezbollah seems to have opted for giving the STL the silent treatment, declaring through sources that it remains ‘unconcerned’ with the STL and that it doesn’t recognise its authority. Quite how that squares with the fact that Hezbollah is represented in the cabinet that included cooperation with the STL in its policy statement is a mystery. The logical explanation however is that Hezbollah and its allies are choosing not to confront the STL issue, leaving the door open for a Lebanese-style patching up exercise. Significantly, the issue of the ‘fake witnesses’ seems to have been withdrawn from circulation, in contrast to Hezbollah’s previous stance of using this issue as a tool to delegitimize the STL.

On the other side, March 14’s lack of enthusiasm about the indictment was exemplified by the written statement issued by Saad Hariri’s press office. At a different time, Hariri would have used the occasion to deliver a fiery speech rallying support for the STL and regaining political momentum. Given the political capital that he and his allies invested in the STL, his statement represents a lack of willingness to pursue this path aggressively. In fact, March 14 would have been incapable of enforcing the arrest warrants even when it was in power. Now that it has chosen to be on the outside, it has very little power to push for the enforcement of the arrest warrants. The STL has for long been a symbolic issue for Hariri and his allies, but even a symbolic ‘victory’ seems elusive at the moment. Samir Geagea’s statements effectively confirm this resignation among March 14 ranks.

None of this should be surprising, it has been clear for some time now that the STL has become a burden to all sides in Lebanon, but nevertheless an issue that neither side is capable of walking away from or pushing towards a resolution. While the thirty-day period before the indictment is made public is being treated as a stay of execution at the moment, in fact it’s yet another symbolic postponement of an issue that has been central in Lebanese politics for the past six years. We will be treated once again to the spectacle of Lebanese politicians presenting indecisiveness as a virtue. In truth, this clearly reflects how incapable the political class, across the divide, is of solving its problems autonomously.

For background information on the STL and the Hariri assassination, read my article on the subject.

If you would like to be updated about posts on this blog and other articles I publish, follow me on Twitter.

A short handbook to revolution: Six myths about the Arab uprisings

2011-06-24T11:13:00.000-07:00

The spectacular and expeditious ousting of Mubarak and Ben-Ali from their long-held positions of power left many scrambling for a convenient interpretation. What largely emerged however were hastily constructed narratives designed more to confirm their authors’ convictions than to reveal meaning. It didn’t take long for those accounts to be rattled when the subsequent uprisings did not adhere to the neat model observed in Egypt and Tunisia. Libya’s uprising was the first to deviate from the script, followed by Bahrain, Yemen and lastly Syria. As we encounter complex situations threatening extended periods of instability, it's time to dispel some of the lingering myths about the uprisings.

It’s the Arab awakening

Much has been said about the uprisings representing an Arab awakening, but this ignores that fact that the uprisings have been effectively limited to six countries so far. It is important to recognise that while there is a broader Arab dimension, the uprisings are still inherently bound with the dynamics inside their own countries. Furthermore, the idea of an ‘awakening’ implies that the Arab masses have been dormant for decades, ignoring the various challenges to the regimes in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Algeria and many others, most of which were put down harshly in the past. What really changed is not the political consciousness of the populace, but the nature of the regimes which have experienced the erosion of their authority and a parallel loss of legitimacy. In many ways, we are witnessing the collapse of the authoritarian Arab regimes allowing the population to make a bid to destabilise them. This is specifically applicable to the Arab republics that built their legitimacy on different bases to those of the oil states. Nevertheless, it is not hard to see that this is the beginning of the end of this era in Arab politics.

It’s a revolution

The R-word was brandished about generously after Ben-Ali’s and Mubarak’s unceremonious exits. While those were certainly great achievements by any standard, the role that the army played in both instances was crucial and ultimately aimed at sacrificing the ageing face of the regime in order to contain the uprisings. In both countries, the army didn’t hesitate to use force to halt any further demonstrations, quickly allying itself with conservative political groups that wanted a quick return to normalcy. Those emerging alliances have every interest in preventing a revolution that would radically transform society. The story in both countries is far from over of course, as new political dynamics are created in response to different aspirations stemming from below. But for the time being it appears that the revolutionary tide seems to have been successfully contained.

They’re leaderless

‘Organic’ uprisings are a recent phenomenon, despite attempts to link the colour-coded revolutions such as those of Ukraine and Georgia with earlier examples going as far back as the Indian independence movement. It is not hard to understand why they appeal to people considering the broad disenchantment with politics today, but they ultimately lack a solid basis that could introduce radical political change. (Ukraine and Georgia are good examples.) The urge to see the Arab uprisings as leaderless ignored the fact that success was more likely in the countries that had more advanced forms of organisation, such as Egypt and Tunisia, where political parties, social movements and trade unions played significant roles in the uprisings. In Syria and Libya the lack of leadership has meant a slower pace in galvanising support. In Yemen it allowed other players with political aspirations to enter the fray and attempt to benefit from the efforts of the protest movement. The infatuation with the idea of organic movements has muddled our understanding of the uprisings. We’re inadvertently celebrating one of the most problematic aspects of the uprisings, and one that will make it harder for the uprisings to achieve their goals.

It’s deeper than politics

The uprisings have been frequently portrayed as existential struggles rather than as political conflicts. Some have even claimed that they are about restoring dignity and not projecting aspirations for freedom and democracy. The desire to see the uprisings in these a-political terms reflects the lack of credibility of traditional political movements, but it ignores that the lack of a political vision means alliances constructed around the lowest common denominator. In some instances when established movements joined the uprisings they were regarded suspiciously, as if their aspirations are not legitimate. In particular, many considered the involvement of Islamic parties as dangerous, forgetting that they have been for a long time vehicles for the expression of discontent. If there is a genuine secular alternative to be developed, it cannot rely on vague generalities but on a clear political aims that should address social and economic issues. For example, the debate about the economy in Egypt in the last few months has highlighted the glaring lack of any genuine ideas about how to take the country forward. If the uprisings are to have a real impact they should rely on political vision not on its absence.

They are peaceful

The peaceful nature of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt was widely celebrated. When the Libyan uprising appeared to become an armed insurgency, there were recriminations in some quarters, with some casting aspersions about the rebels' real intentions. Similar thoughts are now being expressed about the Syrian uprising. Things have obviously changed since the Spanish civil war, when international volunteers joined up with the republicans to fight the fascists, there is now very little appetite for armed struggle. Some preferred to see ‘civilised’ demonstrators practising non-violence, even though this effectively meant that the only violence being practised was directed against them. Furthermore, this has ignored the extent to which Arab regimes enforced their authority through their monopoly on violence. Not challenging this monopoly means that the balance of power could not change.

This doesn’t mean however that the uprisings should aim for military victories. In any such confrontation with the regime the chances of success are determined by dissension among the army ranks and neutralising its role, not by winning military confrontations against it. By the time the Libyan rebels were asking for a no-fly zone and western intervention, they had effectively lost that battle. Gaddafi had regrouped and the mass uprising in Tripoli failed to establish itself. It was then surprising to see the same voices that celebrated peaceful protests welcoming western military action. This particular shift represents how problematic non-violence is, reflecting the degradation in the perception of armed struggle.

The West has a moral duty to intervene

This is without a doubt one of the thorniest issues around the uprisings. The lack of appetite for armed uprisings gave way to enthusiasm for a no-fly zone and further military action in Libya. The clue behind this change was a shift in perception, the Libyan uprising was turned from a political conflict into a humanitarian crisis. While many are searching for hidden sinister motivations for the Western intervention in Libya, it was quite clear that liberal interventionism had been given a renewed sense of purpose. The intervention allows Western leaders to boost their moral standing by appearing to be acting in a moral fashion. This could be understood if we lived in some imaginary moral universe in which all the West’s actions were conducted in accordance with moral prescriptions, but hardly makes sense in the one we actually live in. Furthermore, it’s worth inquiring into the source of the West’s supposed moral responsibility: at the moment it seems purely substantiated on the basis of its superior military capabilities. This moral dimension is especially questionable given its role in propping up several of the Arab regimes for decades.

But it would be erroneous to focus solely on military intervention. For several reasons, it doesn’t seem likely at the moment that the West would intervene militarily in Syria. But this hasn’t stopped calls for other types of intervention. Both the US and the EU have imposed sanctions on Syria, and there are repeated calls for president Obama to ask the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad to step down. Obama’s hesitation over Syria is being portrayed as a form of moral cowardice, reflecting the extent to which the liberal appetite for intervention exceeds in many instances political administrations’ willingness. Consequently, a decision that should be firmly in the hands of the Syrian people and that they are paying a heavy price to acquire, the choice of their leaders, is being handed over to external authorities.

Of all the misconceptions about the Arab uprisings, this is the most dangerous. The legitimacy and success of a popular uprising should not be tied to external agents, but to the people themselves. While it might seem cold-hearted to argue for that while demonstrations are being violently suppressed, it’s worth remembering that the uprising is a risk that people are taking while fully aware of the consequences. By intervening, we are ultimately taking away a right that the people are trying to acquire for themselves of their own will.

If there's a common theme among the myths about the Arab uprisings it's the sense that they are fragile revolutions. To many observers and, sometimes, the people themselves, the uprisings appear to constantly face the risk of failure and appropriation by counter-revolutionary forces. This anxiety is prescribing limitations to what the uprisings can achieve and the extent to which they could prevail independently. Revolution is being transformed from an act of self-determination into a laudable yet feeble effort that needs external support. This perception reflects the lack of faith in the idea of revolution itself and appears to be a central paradox of the Arab uprisings.

If you would like to be updated about posts on this blog and other articles I publish, follow me on Twitter.

The Syrian Uprising: the Prospect of a Protracted Stalemate and Western Intervention

2011-06-20T08:49:00.000-07:00

Note: A German version of this article has been published at Novo Argumente

Three months on and it’s clear that the Syrian uprising is not lacking in stamina. While it may have seemed for a while back in February that Syria was immune from the uprisings that swept across the Arab world, it didn’t take long for a minor spark to set in motion a series of demonstrations across the country. The Syrian regime’s authority was quickly undermined as the Syrian people took to the streets demanding freedom and political reform. The harsh retaliation has not succeeded so far in putting down the protest movement that comes alive every Friday in Syrian cities and towns. But it is also clear that the Syrian Uprising has failed to attain the critical mass required to stage large-scale demonstrations in the capital Damascus or the largest city Aleppo. The sporadic nature of both the uprising and the government’s retaliation points to a protracted struggle that is likely to go on for some time. As the prospect of a stalemate becomes more evident, calls for external intervention are becoming more persistent. Such calls represent a real danger to the prospects for change.

Much has been made of the 'leaderless' nature of the Arab uprisings and the absence of political ideologies spurring them. Such claims were repeated uncritically in the aftermath of Mubarak’s departure, reflecting primarily the biases of observers who wanted to believe that the Egyptian uprising was organic and spontaneous. As an Al-Jazeera documentary subsequently illustrated, the April 6th Movement played a significant role in organising the demonstrations and orchestrating the logistics of the mass uprising. While movements like Kefaya and April 6th did not represent conventional political movements, the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in galvanising mass support was largely and conveniently ignored. This naive interpretation of the events failed to acknowledge the important role that organisation played in Egypt and, subsequently, the role that the lack of political organisation is playing in Syria and Libya in particular.

It would be wrong to assume that political organisation on its own is the decisive factor in the success or failure of uprisings, but the presence of a ‘revolutionary infrastructure’ in the form of political movements and organisational mechanisms has been a very important factor in taking the uprisings to the national centre stage. For a variety of historical reasons, the Syrian uprising was the least prepared for this challenge. Firstly, political association has been strictly controlled in Syria for decades, with many activists spending decades in and out of prison. The relative freedom that the Muslim Brotherhood had in Egypt, despite the official ban, was unheard of in Syria. The crackdown on the Islamist movement in the early 80s in Syria pushed it underground where it remained since then. In parallel, the Egyptian press had far more freedom and Mubarak’s regime tolerated much higher levels of criticism than its Syrian counterpart. Thirdly, the crackdown on the ‘Damascus Spring’ at the beginning of the previous decade made many activists wary of publicly confronting the regime. Crucially, a large number of the ‘opposition’ figures were forced into exile where they have little influence on the ground. Those factors resulted in a lack of a centralised organisation leading the uprising, leaving ordinary Syrians to push it forward purely through their determination.

As a result of this lack of centralised organisation, the Syrian uprising has so far taken the shape of sporadic demonstrations on the ‘margins’, albeit with some reportedly attracting as many as 100,000 people. It is evident by now that regional organisation has become very effective, but nation-wide coordination has not yet been able to mobilise centralised mass demonstrations. The regime has managed so far to keep its ‘strongholds’ in Damascus and Aleppo reasonably under control and occasionally stage a show of popular support. But while some have interpreted this as indicative of significant levels of support for Bashar Al-Assad’s rule, it is equally probable that the fear of uncertainty is an even bigger barrier towards encouraging more people to join in with the demonstrators. This is particularly true of religious minorities who fear not so much Sunni-domination in case of the current regime’s collapse but the prospect of a long civil war. Given Syria’s geographic position between Lebanon and Iraq, such prospect is inevitably present in people’s minds.

There have been attempts at creating organisational mechanisms to articulate the demands of the Syrian uprising and propose transitional strategies, but they have largely failed to draw consensus. At the beginning of June, a number of dissident groups operating mainly outside Syria gathered in Antalya in Turkey for a three-day conference and issued a declaration asking for president Assad to step down and a number of subsequent measures concluding with parliamentary and presidential elections. The conference was boycotted by several groups, such as the Kurdish parties, while many Syria-based activists declared the conference unrepresentative of the people. The Local Coordination Committees of Syria has emerged as a credible grassroots coalition, but it’s still not clear how much influence it has on the ground nor how much popular support it enjoys. It could be just a matter of time before legitimate representation of the uprising prevails, but as time passes it seems that there is further division among the opposition.

A clear sign of this was an unprecedented opposition conference held in Damascus on the 27^th of June under the slogan "Syria for everyone under a democratic civil state." The meeting was attended by a number of opposition and ‘independent’ figures such as the writer Michel Kilo, a long-time critic of the Syrian regime whose vocal opposition of the regime landed him in prison several more than once. Several of the attendees are also high-profile intellectuals with a varied history of opposition to the regime. Despite that, the meeting had been clearly endorsed by the government allowing the meeting to take place publicly in the presence of the media at a Damascus hotel. The Syrian news agency SANA reported on the conference in uncharacteristically transparent language, reflecting the level of official endorsement.

While the participants were critical of the government’s response to the protests, which they called a "popular peaceful Intifada", their apprehension about the uprising was clear in their reference to "all forms of sectarian instigation". In fact, the guardedness of the older generation of intellectuals about the uprising has been apparent for some time and has been often expressed in the form of anxiety about the sectarian motivations behind it and the fear of civil strife. But what this indicates primarily are the extent to which the elite that should have played a leading role in the uprising finds itself in the position of an external observer. Accepting tacit official endorsement has no doubt undermined the credibility of the figures involved in the meeting, reflecting the wide gap between them and the uprising’s grassroots. In all likelihood, the participants will lose any influence they might have enjoyed over the uprising, but their initiative will certainly create more division among the ranks of opposition.

With the balance of power unlikely to change any time soon, the prospect of a protracted ‘war of attrition’ remains very plausible. At this moment, it seems plausible that either side could seize the initiative. But judging by the speech that Al-Assad gave on the 20^th of June, it doesn't seem that he has formulated a plan of action that could allow him to end this challenge to his rule. Al-Assad effectively undermined his own case by listing a number of political, administrative and security failures that have arisen during his 11-year rule. He did not take responsibility for those failures nor did he propose meaningful reforms. For its part, the uprising faces the tough challenge of convincing the rest of the population to join its ranks and mobilise for action in Damascus and Aleppo. This is not a purely organisational question, at the moment no one is sure what the political alternative to the Baath's rule is and vague generalities won't suffice in this situation. Syria is in a different situation to that of Egypt and Tunisia and the prospect of the army pushing Assad out is neither likely nor desirable for the Syrian people. The political alternative has to be built convincingly, a process that cannot be created from the void.

Against this backdrop and the deepening unease with the prospect of a stalemate, calls for outside intervention are completely misplaced. Much like in Libya, there’s a desire to transform how we view the Syrian uprising, changing it from a political conflict into a humanitarian crisis. Little notice is paid to the fact that this process was accompanied by the virtual defeat of the Libyan uprising, once it failed to expand into Tripoli and entered a ‘defensive’ stage. While the West seems to have little appetite for military intervention in Syria at the moment, its attempt at assuming moral custodianship of the Syrian uprising is still deeply problematic. Turkish involvement is increasingly welcomed as an acceptable form of intervention, providing a vehicle for international action. In reality, it would be equally problematic. It would be a cruel irony for the Syrian people to exchange national authoritarian rule for external custodianship. Both are encroachments on their autonomy and desire for self-determination. This might be a long struggle, but it should be left in the hands of the Syrian people. They have paid far too heavy a price for that to be taken away from them.

If you would like to be updated about posts on this blog and other articles I publish, follow me on Twitter.

Syria Synergy: Ploughing on without a plan? My interview on Russia Today

2011-06-18T13:09:00.000-07:00

Watch the interview I did for Russia Today on the situation in Syria and the prospects of Western intervention there.

The struggle for democracy in the Middle East and North Africa: Audio of my talk in Manchester

2011-06-17T03:58:00.000-07:00

The Manchester Salon which hosted my talk on the Arab Uprisings and Western Intervention has provided an audio recording of my introduction and the discussion that followed.

J392M7U9Q7UU

The Cabinet of Curiosities: Is Lebanon finally abandoning consensual politics?

2011-06-13T10:22:00.000-07:00

The long wait is over. Lebanon finally has a new cabinet following four and a half months of intense haggling, horse-trading and political paralysis that coincided with one of the most tumultuous periods in the region. Earlier today Prime Minister-designate Najib Mikati announced the formation of the new cabinet that some have imaginatively labeled ‘one-sided’, in reference to the supposed predominance of March 8 figures within it. The complicated manoeuvres that paved the way for its formation should dispel any illusions that this cabinet is one-sided in any politically meaningful way. Nevertheless, because of the exclusion of March 14 figures from its ranks it leaves the country with something resembling a parliamentary opposition. Below are several preliminary observations on the significance of this situation and the character of this cabinet:

- Whatever happened to the Hezbollah Coup?

Much was made of the fact that the resignation of March 8 ministers from the national unity government back in January and Walid Jumblatt’s withdrawal from March 14 represented an anti-constitutional coup that would hand Lebanon over to Hezbollah and allow it to pursue a ‘sinister’ political agenda. Such over-excited leaps of the imagination should have been put to rest when the cabinet failed to materialise amid intense rivalries among March 8 factions, and between March 8 and Mikati. The fact that this cabinet has only two Hezbollah members should dispel any lingering doubts. Hezbollah’s actions in the lead-up to the ministerial resignations were defensive in nature, primarily aiming to avoid the prospect of STL (Special Tribunal for Lebanon) indictments of some of its cadres.

Hezbollah and its allies do not have a serious political programme to govern in Lebanon, a fact that is still widely ignored despite all the evidence. The recruitment of Mikati in particular for the Prime Minister’s job should have illustrated March 8’s desire to share power, but this choice was widely misinterpreted.

- Mikati and the End of Harirism

If you believed the March 8 hype that followed the ministerial resignations, a new era of accountability and reform was about to be ushered in. The Free Patriotic Movement in particular was very vocal about this, emphasising its credentials as an ‘untainted’ movement that shuns the Lebanese political ‘game.’ Its critique of the political establishment encompassed the entire post-war period, focusing almost exclusively on ‘Harirism’ as the chief culprit, despite the fact that all its allies in March 8 had been major players in the post-war order. Harirism was loudly renounced as a corrupt ‘new-liberal’ project that aimed to privatise valuable state assets and impoverish the general population.

It was curious then that the Prime Minister’s job was handed to Najib Mikati, a business tycoon who is actually wealthier than Saad Hariri, the man he replaced. Mikati had also benefited significantly from the post-war political arrangements, both financially and politically. Given how incompetent Saad Hariri turned out to be as a political leader, Mikati in fact represented the ideal candidate to lead Harirism as a political and economic project. This primarily represents acknowledging the confessional division of labour that hands over economic leadership to key Sunni figures, with the support of wealthy Christian businessmen that are dependent on financing from the Gulf, and particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Despite the FPM’s and Hezbollah’s loud proclamations about the end of Harirism, Mikati’s appointment was in fact an attempt at rescuing Harirism ‘sans-Hariri’. In other words, let’s not rock the boat too much. Note that the major economic posts in Mikati’s cabinet have all went to businessmen and industrialists not economists or academics.

It’s a heavily Syrian-influenced cabinet

With the visible decline of the Syrian regime’s authority at home and abroad, it’s worth considering what this statement actually means. Had the Syrian regime really considered the formation of the cabinet a priority, why did the process take so long among a group made up exclusively of its ‘allies’? Furthermore, with the caretaker government of Saad Hariri bending over backwards to accommodate the Syrian regime since the uprising in Syria started, and going out of its way to avoid confronting it, I wonder what the significance of a Syrian-influenced cabinet is. The one aspect that this reveals is how dependent the entire Lebanese political class is on Syrian patronage, to the extent that it has become entirely incapable of any independent decision making in the absence of clear signals originating from Damascus. The emphasis on the STL in this context is misplaced. For all intents and purposes, Syria has been exonerated by the STL leaving Hezbollah in the dock. It’s worth nothing that the West has declined to use the STL as a tool against the Syrian regime during the past few weeks when it was desperately looking for soft instruments to apply pressure.

- It’s a one-sided cabinet.

This is a really curious conclusion. It’s true that the new cabinet has excluded (remaining) March 14 figures, but it’s ludicrous to claim that it’s one-sided. The extent of horse-trading and compromise required to bring the cabinet into being was revealed shortly after its announcement with Talal Arslan declining to participate because he did not receive a portfolio. There is also talk of other possible resignations. Notably, many of the figures in this cabinet had been key figures in the post-2005 era. This owes more to the malleability of allegiance within Lebanese politics than to any solid conviction, as Walid Jumblatt’s frequent u-turns attest to.

The obvious exception within this cabinet is the large number of portfolios handed to the Change and Reform parliamentary bloc led by Michel Aoun’s FPM. It is the one aspect of this cabinet that resembles a political statement of intent. But in truth, the large share the Aoun received is a poisoned chalice that no one else wanted. Given that Aoun’s alliance with Syria has become an embarrassment, he’s gambling on a solid performance in government to restore popular support. There’s little chance of this happening however in a weak cabinet that was brought into being more as a face-saving exercise than a bold grab at power. It is as divided and riddled with compromises as any of its predecessors, but Aoun is effectively running out of space to manoeuvre politically.

I called this ‘the Cabinet of Curiosities’ because in many ways it breaks away with convention to overcome the paralysis in the Lebanese political system and the failure of March 8 to offer a solid programme of governance. The unequal number of Sunni and Shiite minsters is one of those ‘innovations’, dispensing with the token gesture of appointing women ministers is another. The one distinctive aspect about it is that it created a de facto parliamentary opposition for the first time in a long while in Lebanon. Said oppositions consists primarily of March 14, which will have to restructure itself to perform this role effectively. I have little faith that this will actually happen, this being the flip-side of March 8’s inability to govern. Nevertheless, the success of both in playing those roles would represent a significant step forward for Lebanese politics which has been stuck for too long in the vicious cycle of consensual politics.

If you would like to be updated about posts on this blog and other articles I publish, follow me on Twitter.

The uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa: Watch a discussion with WorldWrite volunteers

2011-06-08T06:37:00.000-07:00

Watch a video of the discussion I did with WorldWrite volunteers about the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa.

The No-Fly Zone in Libya: Hijacking the Arab Uprisings

2011-03-18T11:06:00.000-07:00

Last night’s UN Security Council’s decision to authorise military action in Libya was greeted with almost universal jubilation revealing how confused the anti-imperialist camp has become. The very same people who had been opposed to the US invasion and continuing presence in Iraq and Afghanistan cheered the decision that will supposedly prevent Qaddafi from massacring his people. This also revealed the left’s lack of faith in revolutionary politics: overnight the Libyans were turned from subjects attempting to take control of their destiny into victims in need of protection. The most troubling aspect of this is the willingness to recognise the West’s moral superiority, failing to acknowledge that Western intervention has been actively propping up authoritarian Arab regimes for decades. The no-fly zone is nothing to celebrate, on the contrary it signals a major turning point that will hand the West the initiative allowing it to ensure its interests are maintained in the region. It will also undermine the legitimacy of the autonomous Arab uprisings as they begin to be associated with Western sponsorship. We have entered a new phase with direct Western intervention that will pose serious threats to the pursuit of freedom in Arab countries.

There is no doubt that many people who support the no-fly zone are driven by good intentions, and it’s tough to watch Gaddafi’s forces regain ground and advance towards Benghazi without feeling the need to ‘do something’. This is particularly understandable given the early success of the Libyan uprising and the sense of expectation it created, contrasted with the current frustration of seeing Gaddafi about to crush the democracy movement. Yet, it is very important to resist the temptation to intervene at any cost. Let’s not forget what the uprisings are about: people attempting to shape their destiny. In other words, they are about autonomy, self-determination and the manifestation of popular will. No matter how well-intentioned outside intervention is, and Western intervention in the region has proved to be far from well-intentioned, it contradicts those principles.

The celebrations that erupted on the streets of Benghazi following the announcement of UNSC resolution 1973 were seen by many as legitimising this intervention, since the people of Libya are asking for intervention then the UN decision becomes credible, so the argument goes. Again it’s understandable that the rebels when facing the prospect of defeat would reach out for any form of help, but this does not justify military intervention, whether sanctioned by the UN or not. The UN and Western governments are deciding for themselves which voices to listen to in Libya in a clear contradiction of the principles of sovereignty and self-determination. The dubious nature of the decision to override Libya’s sovereignty is only amplified by the near-silence over the crackdown on the protests in Bahrain, which has hardly moved Western governments to act. Of course intervention in Bahrain would be equally illegitimate and ill-advised, but it reveals the West’s hypocrisy and opportunism in taking the moral high ground over Libya while ignoring the situation in Bahrain, where the West’s regional allies are actively participating in putting down the uprising.

The astounding aspect of the West’s rush to intervene in Libya, led in particular by David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy, is how quickly the lessons of the Iraq invasion and its catastrophic aftermath have been forgotten. The UN and Western governments have sought to make distinctions between the two Libya and Iraq by sanctioning all military action but ruling out an invasion, in an attempt to portray this as a humanitarian intervention rather than regime change. But the utter folly of this distinction is remarkable. The most that a no-fly zone would achieve is a stalemate. Gaddafi’s forces would be prevented from making any advance and attacks on civilians would be stopped, but given the meagre military capabilities of the opposition, they will not be able to achieve victory either. How long would be after that when the calls for further intervention would be intensified, in a situation that we have witnessed several times before from Bosnia to Iraq? The West having already committed itself would be unable to withdraw from the situation, eventually making an invasion a very likely prospect. Not that there is a distinction anyway, the UN resolution is a declaration of war on Libya that can only escalate in magnitude.

Already there are voices making the case for such an increased intervention. Today David Aaronovitch, one of the main cheerleaders of the Iraq war, wrote an article in The Times arguing that ‘the price of inaction in Libya is far too high’. Aaronovitch’s article clearly reveals the prism of risk through which the West now primarily regards events in the world, as he put it: ‘if we don’t bomb Gaddafi’s tanks, Europe is likely to face a wave of refugees and a new generation of jihadis’. Like the argument for the Iraq war, this reveals the precautionary approach that drives Western pre-emptive interventions. In the case of unpopular leaders like Cameron and Sarkozy, it’s also about trying to find a moral sense of purpose abroad to compensate for their lack of credibility at home. Obama was convinced to tag along after his earlier hesitation, with the attractive prospect of compensating for his incompetent handling of the Egyptian uprising and his failure to reign in his allies in the Gulf. But, in effect, this is a recipe for disaster as the intervention has neither a clear purpose nor a desirable outcome that could be achieved without further military intervention.

The West was undoubtedly caught off-guard with the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, and the actions of Western governments over the past few weeks have revealed astonishing levels of incompetence. They also revealed the extent to which their influence in the region has deteriorated, robbing them of the ability to dictate the course of events. Enforcing the no-fly zone over Libya will allow the West to portray itself in a better light and take back the initiative, but in effect it is only likely to complicate the situation on the ground further. The legitimacy of the Libyan uprising can only be undermined through its association with Western powers, while Gaddafi will be able to deploy the anti-Western card that he is so adept at. It will also weaken the autonomous impulse of the Arab uprisings, replacing popular action as a means for political change with Western sponsorship and protection. This can only mean the return of imperial influence under a different guise. The no-fly zone represents an attempt at hijacking the Arab uprisings and opposing it should become a political priority.

The Egyptian Uprising: on the universal aspiration for freedom

2011-02-04T11:03:00.000-08:00

The sheer exhilaration that I felt in response to the Egyptian uprising, admittedly as a voluntarily-implicated observer, has been somewhat dampened by the reaction of Western elites to this phenomenal display of courage and yearning for change. On the one hand, it seemed that the Egyptian people have managed, despite extremely adverse circumstances, to translate the universal ideals of liberty and autonomy into concrete political actions that have inspired millions around the world. But on the other hand it seems to have exposed how little faith in those very same ideals there is in the West today, as exemplified by the strange debates that are being conducted about the prospects of the Egyptian uprising. The most bizarre suggestion that I have heard is that this uprising somehow vindicates the neo-con position that democracy is possible in the Middle East! This confirms the impression that I had about some in the anti-Iraq War camp: their opposition to the War was not based on a principled rejection of Western intervention but on their lack of faith in democracy and liberty as universal values.

This position is normally phrased through the language of cultural relativism: we can’t impose our values on other cultures, we can’t pretend to know what’s better for other people, and the democratic model is not suitable for everyone. To be sure, many Arab intellectuals have fully absorbed this patronising outlook, ironically by uncritically accepting ideas that are fashionable in Western academic circles. The most blatant omission within such assumptions is that the problem here is not in the values themselves but in the act of their forceful imposition. Democracy can only thrive as a translation of popular will, and that can only develop within an autonomous framework. It is absolutely hypocritical of the West to pretend today that democracy is not suitable for Egypt, having interfered actively for several decades to prop up the Mubarak’s regime and support with large packages of military aid, and not see that as one of the key factors that worked against the development of the pro-democracy movement. The gnashing of teeth in Washington about the prospect of Egypt turning into ‘another Iran’, aside from being unjustified, is even more hypocritical considering the historic support that the US lent to Islamic movements with the aim of fighting the spread of communism.

The historical short-sightedness that afflicts the contemporary Western outlook towards the Arab world completely ignores the history of secular movements and uprisings there throughout the 20th century, and even more blatantly ignores the role of the West in combating the spread of those movements. The most pressing question for Western elites has now become whether it is possible for democracy to develop in Arab countries, feeding the scepticism and anxiety about the Egyptian uprising. Astoundingly, it doesn’t strike any of those asking this question that merely posing it is incredibly patronising, as if there is something about Arabs that is inherently opposed to democracy. Many will point to the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections and the victory of the Islamic Front in the 1992 elections in Algeria as evidence that Arabs will inevitably vote for Islamic parties when given the chance. Aside from the obvious disregard for democracy that this suggests, it also ignores the context in which those electoral victories were achieved. Crucially, Western intervention had a role to play in both instances: by backing the authoritarian Algerian regime and by promoting and forcefully pushing the peace process that discredited the Palestinian Authority and led to popular discontent with its rule.

But what’s happening now in Egypt should be a reminder that democracy is a messy business, unlike the neutered version that European bureaucrats promote today. It seems that Western elites can only understand democracy through the prism of the paternalistic version they have been promoting for decades and that’s why the un-predictability of the Egyptian uprising scares them. No one knows for certain what the outcome will be, especially given the frantic Western efforts to find a suitable solution that would maintain ‘stability’, but the brave actions of the Egyptian people today are the living embodiment of the universal aspirations for freedom and democracy. It is Western elites and governments that are betraying those ideals through their hypocritical and cynical attitude. The sheer arrogance of suggesting that people who are risking their lives by standing up against a brutal regime are not ‘ready for democracy’ is insulting and patronising. Western governments should stop lecturing about democracy now that their lack of belief in it has been starkly exposed.

But as one friend jokingly remarked, perhaps the West is not ready for democracy yet.

Tunisia: Hopes, Myths and Copycat Revolutions

2011-01-17T16:21:00.000-08:00

The success of the Tunisian uprising in forcing President Bin Ali to relinquish power last week has sparked off hopes of change across the Arab world. Considering that most Arab leaders hang on to power till the last day of their lives, this is no mean feat. Bin Ali's departure from office after 23 years of autocratic rule and as a result of a popular uprising seems to have broken the crippling barrier of fear. The question that many are asking now is who's next? Even the BBC has volunteered a few candidates and asked 'will there be a domino effect?'

Many are anticipating a 'ripple effect' that could sweep across the region and topple one ruler after another. The collapse of communism in the Eastern Bloc countries seems to be the favoured precedent for this 'prediction'. I have to admit that I don't quite see the similarities. The Eastern Bloc countries had much more in common than Arab countries have today, and were furthermore firmly controlled by the Soviet Union. By contrast, Arab countries vary from each other substantially. A small oil-rich country like Qatar has very little in common with a large and diverse country like Sudan. Even two neighbouring countries like Tunisia and Algeria, despite undergoing similar historical experiences, are today difficult to compare.

What most observers are missing is the historical specificity of each country beyond the stereotype of an oppressed population dominated by corrupt rulers. To a certain extent, this is partially due to the legacy of pan-Arabism. Despite the failure of pan-Arabism as a political project, it remains powerful in the social and political imagination of many Arabs, if only at a rhetorical level. The dream of Arab unity is a fantasy, but a very powerful one at that. The referendum in South Sudan for example was greeted with hostility by most Arabs, despite how little they know about the conflict there and the nature of the struggle of the Southern Sudanese. Any secession within the Arab world, particularly by non-Arabs, is automatically treated with antagonism.

The reaction to the Tunisian uprising in the Arab world is a sort of flip-side to this: most choose to see the uprising in the Arab rather than the Tunisian context. Much like with the Palestinian struggle before, the courageous actions of the Tunisian people have been appropriated as if the Tunisians are fighting a battle in the name of all Arabs. 'We are all Tunisians now', some like to think, but we are not. Such an attitude only demeans the Tunisian uprising and dislocates it from its context. This is the struggle of the Tunisian people for freedom, not an Arab fantasy.

But the symbolism of an Arab dictator fleeing in face on a popular uprising seems to have overridden a rational interpretation of the events. As the Tunisian people know all too well, this is only the beginning of the road and there are substantial risks ahead. I don't wish to be pessimistic, but the formation of the national unity government today has left most of the power in the same hands. To call this a revolution at this stage is a grave, but perhaps pardonable, error of judgement. Tunisia may have taken another step towards becoming more democratic, but this is far from a radical upset of the power structure. But, I say again, I am not dismissive and the Tunisian people can still take matters in their own hands.

To complicate matters more, much has also been said about how this is a 'revolution without a leader'. This is a dismissive attitude and also one that favours a fantasy version of the events. It is dismissive of the role that the Tunisian opposition in all its wings has played in this uprising. The high number of political prisoners in Tunisia is testament to the fact that the opposition had been active for decades, if ineffective. The fans of the Wikileaks/Twitter school of thought may like to promote the idea that is a visceral type of uprising, but this only downplays the role of political organisation and its importance for genuine political change. There may have not been a clear leader during the demonstrations of past few weeks, but this does not mean political organisation did not play a role in how events unfolded.

The so-called 'ripple effect' does not take into account the state of political organisation within every Arab country and the availability of a strong, if repressed, opposition parties. In Egypt for example, the opposition has been tamed by decades of oppression and appeasement, as evidenced by the fact that the most celebrated opposition figure is a former UN bureaucrat who has spent the last three decades away from Egypt and its politics. Other countries suffer from deep demographic 'fault lines' that are likely to consume any uprising and turn into a sectarian war, much like what happened in Lebanon in the 70s. This is not a simple story of 'dictators versus the people': most of the rulers, although autocratic, derive their power from complex structures that are patriarchal and traditional in nature. Ironically, it is perhaps Tunisia's harsh state-driven secularisation and modernisation that may have contributed to this uprising indirectly. There is hardly any other Arab country that has gone through similar transformations since independence.

The bitter irony of the Tunisian uprising is that the hopes that it inspired have been taken all too literally by some. There are various reports of people setting themselves on fire across the Arab world in the hope, perhaps, of sparking similar uprisings. But this is anger turned inwards, albeit for the sake of higher aspirations. Tunisia should not a prototype Arab revolution but a universal lesson in the value of the fight for freedom.

The March 8 Paradox: Thoughts on Nasrallah's Speech

2011-01-16T14:07:00.000-08:00

On the eve of the parliamentary consultations to determine the next Prime Minister of Lebanon and, as rumour has it, the long-awaited indictment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), the Secretary General of Hezbollah Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah delivered a speech this evening in which he declared March 8's decision not to nominate Hariri again for the post. Hezbollah's ally Michel Aoun, head of the Free Patriotic Movement, had earlier in the day made a similar declaration. Both stressed that their opposition to Hariri's return to the premiership is not solely related to the STL, but also to the shoddy performance of the government and its incompetence.

Nasrallah was however atypically downbeat in his delivery. Tellingly, he did not claim that the opposition has the upper hand in the prime ministerial nominations, hinting that March 14 may still have a numerical advantage in the parliament. Aoun, on the other hand, was much more forceful and assertive. This may explain the sense that many within the FPM feel that they are no very close to forming a March 8-led government and implementing their reform programme. If they can summon the parliamentary majority, that is their constitutional right and they should be allowed to do so without foreign intervention. Yet, I can't help but wonder about the timing of this move and the new-found political reform project.

The March 8 mass-resignations from the cabinet were triggered by the failure of the much-hyped Saudi-Syrian effort to deliver a deal that would absorb the impact of an STL indictment of Hezbollah members. March 8 claimed that last-minute American pressure scuppered the S-S initiative as it is known and forced Hariri to walk away despite allegedly having agreed to several steps that would distance the Lebanese government from the STL. What March 8 is not publicly discussing is what their side of the deal would entail, but it was largely understood to mean their continuing participation in the national unity government and maintaining support for Hariri as Prime Minister.

This is where I think March 8's hypocrisy becomes obvious. A week ago they were willing to lend Hariri their political support in return for distancing himself and the Lebanese government from the STL and its indictments. Today, they have suddenly realised that the level of corruptness and mismanagement in the government can no longer be tolerated. Despite this, certain March 8 figures, including Nabih Berri the speaker of the parliament, have continued to indicate that Hariri can still secure their support if he accepted the terms of the Saudi-Syrian deal. At one level, this indicates that the March 8 is far from certain of gaining the upper hand in the parliamentary consultations in the next two days. Secondly, it indicates that despite the rhetorical emphasis on reform, their real aim remains the dismantling of support for the STL.

Finally, it's worth nothing that Hezbollah's position and that of the FPM are not exactly aligned, and this must put pressure on their alliance despite outward appearances. The Saudi-Syrian deal would have unburdened Hezbollah by eliminating the STL danger, or at least ameliorating it, leaving them in a secure position within the Lebanese power structure. But this deal would have hit the FPM hard since it remains very vocal on reform, a position which will only suffer by their continuing participation in a Hariri-led cabinet. A March 8 government would suit the FPM well, but not so much Hezbollah. It remains to be seen whether Hezbollah and its allies would actually summon the support and the political will to go through with such an endeavour, but given the circumstances, I expect the possibilities of this actually happening to be very slim.

A political reform project cannot be born suddenly out of an impasse in Saudi-Syrian negotiations and the complex circumstances surrounding the STL indictments. It would take more than this to make me believe that March 8 have stumbled upon such a project. I am afraid that we're in for another protracted round of the usual horse-trading, a tie on Tuesday would be the earliest indication of this.

Postscript: I'm not given to idle speculation, but given that it's the national pass time I think those two scenarios are likely: Firstly, March 8 is allowed to form a cabinet with the tacit approval of Hariri. Its main function would be to annul the agreements with the UN regarding the STL and remove support from it without Hariri's participation. Such a cabinet would have a short life and be followed by Hariri's return to power. Secondly, no clear name emerges out of the consultation, leading to a political vacuum during which the STL indictments are not acted upon in Lebanon. Again, we will get an indication on Tuesday.

When Karl Marx quoted Hariri

2011-01-13T08:25:00.000-08:00

"He who never destroys what he has built, ever stands

On this terrestrial world, which itself never stands still,"

says Hariri, who is no Frenchman by birth, but an Arab."

(Karl Marx, On Freedom of the Press)

No, not that Hariri, but Abu Muhammad al Qasim ibn Ali al-Hariri, the medieval Arab poet best know for Al-Maqamat, his popular book of anecdotes (al-Hariri comes from my mother's hometown, Basra in Iraq).

I particularly like the next passage that Marx quotes:

"He who has a tongue and does not speak,

Who has a sword and does not fight,

What is he indeed but a wretched wight?"

Many claims have erroneously been made about Marx's Euro-centrism, this is completely untrue. His vast knowledge of other cultures says otherwise.

The other misunderstood dimension of Marx's work is his emphasis on freedom. A lesson for censorious leftists today...

Lebanon's self-induced paralysis

2011-01-13T05:29:00.000-08:00

Firstly, the significance of latest ‘crisis’ to hit the Lebanese political system following the resignation of 11 cabinet ministers yesterday, and the de facto resignation of the cabinet that ensued, should be properly understood. The Lebanese confessional system appears to be exhibiting the symptoms of the law of diminishing returns: in the past this system used to function for a couple of decades in between major crises. This cycle how now been shortened to two years. By any objective measure, this system has now completely exhausted itself. Nevertheless, a viable alternative remains conspicuously absent.

Secondly, it is important to observe how both sides across the political divide have contrived to arrive at a standstill, purposefully avoiding taking decisions that would avert a crisis. It seems that both March 8 and March 14 were content to leave the country in a state of political vacuum in anticipation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s awaited indictment in the case of the assassination of late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Rather than seeing this complacency for the stark abdication of responsibility that it is, many voices assert that either side ‘must know something we don’t know.’ This twisted political logic must be confronted.

The evidence:
March 14: Prime Minister Saad Hariri and his political allies have effectively paralysed the cabinet for months now, for fear of a confrontation with the ‘cabinet opposition’ over the ‘false witnesses’ issue. Hariri extended his stay outside Lebanon at a time of turmoil, leaving his allies and supporters in a state of confusion and disarray. His presence in the US during this week reinforced the notion that the US was behind scuppering the long-awaited Syrian-Saudi deal that was expected to absorb the impact of the STL indictment. While I remain completely opposed to any outside intervention, be it Syrian, Saudi or American, Hariri’s behaviour seemed to indicate that he is placing his confidence in the US instead of other regional powers. No matter what the reason is, this is not strong leadership.

March 8: the cabinet resignations were the least disruptive option they could have chosen. I don’t mean this in a good way. Hezbollah and its allies are victims of their own high-pitched rhetoric: having agitated for so long and so vocally over the STL they were forced to ‘do something’ when the Syrian-Saudi deal fell apart. As it happens, they deliberately chose a course of action that instead of forcing a resolution would now ensure a protracted process of wrangling and accompanying political paralysis. They have wisely avoided street demonstrations, for now, as these would be likely to lead to violent confrontations in the current tense climate, but they had other options they could have exercised.

But in order to explore those options, we must remember the ‘big unknown’ now: where does Walid Jumblatt stand exactly? The reason of course is that his 11-member parliamentary block could swing the parliamentary majority from one side to the other. As it happened, Jumblatt seems to be still negotiating a space in the middle, for the time being. His ministers did not resign yesterday despite his assertions that he is now firmly back in the Syrian camp. This is not a detail: we now have a parliament that is ambiguous in its constitution. Neither camp can claim legitimacy under these circumstances. Typically, the voice of the citizens is the first thing to be suspended in a time of a crisis.

Had the opposition had more self-purpose and clarity, they should have forced Jumblatt to choose sides and speed up the resolution of this crisis. The first option they had was to force a motion of no-confidence and bring down the government in the parliament. Despite the language used yesterday, this would have been the ‘democratic and constitutional’ option, not their weak mass resignations. Furthermore, they should have then used the parliamentary majority that Jumblatt would supply to govern on their own, nominating their own Prime Minister. Instead, they will now start a protracted process of arriving at a suitable replacement for Hariri while the country remains in limbo.

Typically, most of the analysis I’ve come across has focused on the minutiae of the situation, remaining oblivious to the fact that we’re in a system that cannot guarantee stability for more than a few months at a time. This is a self-induced crisis orchestrated by the political classes for lack of any real vision or sense of purpose, action through inaction. Attempts at rationalising this behaviour through tactical justifications are entertaining but meaningless diversions. The system itself is failing, and neither camp can be trusted to propose an alternative. Can we see this abdication of responsibility for what it is?

Look at the situation again: the Lebanese confessional leaders are failing to resolve their differences through their respective chaperons, but meanwhile they are content to suspend democratic mechanism and more importantly the voice of the citizens (The ambiguous parliament). I suppose dissolving the parliament and having new elections so we know at least where we stand would be out of the question? The self-induced paralysis it is, then.

Al-Akhbar/Wikileaks: A postscript. The limits of journalism.

2010-12-12T06:37:00.000-08:00

On the 1st of December, a Syrian worker was shot by Lebanese police dressed in civilian clothes in the early hours of the morning. The murder happened in Hamra, a residential and commercial district of Beirut that is popular with tourists and locals alike. The incident received little coverage in the media, with the exception of Al-Akhbar newspaper which published detailed coverage of the circumstances of the murder and placed it prominently on its digital version. Two things conspired to keep the story from receiving the attention that it deserved: the fact that the victim Abdel Nasser Ahmad was Syrian and Al-Akhbar’s publication of the leaked cables from several Arab countries which dominated the news.

In my previous post about Al-Akhbar and the leaked cables, I criticised the newspaper’s handling of the American documents. In my opinion Al-Akhbar failed to write the story and opted for a mass-dump of information Wikileaks-style instead. But I don’t want my critique to be read as a broad dismissal of Al-Akhbar, much like all Lebanese other media outlets it struggles with its own contradictions and the complexities of Lebanon. However, there’s no denying that it has nurtured a group of young journalists that have become excellent at doing the bread-and-butter work of journalism: the in-depth stories, the investigative angles, and giving voice to those who wouldn’t be heard otherwise.

Abdel Nasser’s story was a very good example of this much needed type of journalism in Lebanon. The reporter talked to the neighbours and a relative of the victim, uncovered the fact that the police were driving in an unmarked car and wearing civilian clothes and that they did not identify themselves before approaching the victim, who then fled and was then shot down. Abdel Nasser’s employer was very distressed with the murder, and many of the neighbours felt the same and they were full of praise for the youth whom they had known for years. I don’t wish to prejudge the outcome of the investigation, but suffice it to say that there are enough unanswered questions in this story to make it merit more media and public attention.

As it happened, the story will be treated as yet another unfortunate incident and will be quickly forgotten, showing how anesthetised Lebanese society has become to the abuses of power. Unmasking the excesses of the security services and the collusion of all political parties in preventing proper accountability should be a priority for journalists, instead of the tittle-tattle of the political classes and blunt propaganda. Al-Akhbar’s Ghassan Saoud for example carried out a series of investigations that exposed exactly how Michel El-Murr, veteran politician and father of the Deputy PM, maintains his political empire in Al-Maten area through a network of corruption, bribery and nepotism. To my eyes, that was a bigger scandal that anything his hapless son said to American diplomats, yet there was no political fallout.

The Lebanese media take their share of the blame for this failure: within every organisation, there is a clearly prescribed political limit that controls the coverage of news stories. Such limit is derived from the organisation’s position within the political spectrum, its ownership and financing, and, most dangerously, self-censorship that passes as ‘responsible reporting.’ While the first two aspects might be out of the control of journalists, the third is firmly theirs. Not long ago, Al-Akhbar’s Ibrahim Al-Amin bragged in an article about his newspaper’s ‘responsibility’ in not publishing all the information it has access to, in the interest of national stability. This is not an exception in the Lebanese press but pretty much the rule, an unforgivable abdication of journalistic responsibility if there’s any.

Many of us who disagree with Al-Akhbar’s politics respect its professionalism and the school of investigative journalism that it has nurtured in a clear departure from the complacency of Lebanese media. However, the important question is why does Al-Akhbar maintain a ceiling for this type of journalism at the expense of promoting the more politically explicit content? Why has Al-Akhbar’s role during the past few months allowed it to become that of relaying ‘regional’ wishes to the Lebanese political classes? We have the right to ask because we recognise the potential role that Al-Akhbar could have, and it’s a much needed one.

P.S. While I still maintain my support and solidarity with Al-Akhbar because of the hacking of its website, I am disgusted by how the Facebook support group has quickly become a mud-slinging platform, particularly insults that are aimed at other media outlets. For example, Elaph is described as a ‘Zionist publication’, always the surest way of silencing opponents. My sense is none of those supporters have learned anything about freedom of speech.

My first article for Muftah.Org 'the Key to Middle East and North Africa Policy-Making'

2010-12-11T04:10:00.000-08:00

I've started writing about Lebanon for Muftah, they just published my first article: "Consensus in Lebanese Politics: The Authoritarian Alternative to Democracy." Muftah is an online publication concerned with Middle East and North Africa Policy-Making, and it's ran and written by an impressive group of volunteers. Please visit the website and if you want to show your support 'Like' their page on Facebook and you can also follow them on Twitter.

A Scandalous Lack of Scandal: Why Wikileaks failed to impress in Lebanon

2010-12-09T11:06:00.000-08:00

First things first: the attacks that brought down Al-Akhbar newspaper’s website today are a despicable action that is as pointless as it is stupid. Pointless because any hope of stemming the flow of information on the internet is a delusion and stupid because those attacks will only reinforce the idea that the leaked information that Al-Akhbar published should be repressed. To me, freedom of speech in the Arab world is much more important than political disagreements and we should all support Al-Akhbar against those attacks.

Many people got really excited when Al-Akhbar started publishing the material it obtained from Wikileaks, predicting ‘catastrophe or even worse’ as I read somewhere. Such predictions reveal the astounding level of naivety that characterises many ‘commentators’ today, particularly the younger generation of bloggers who seem to be far more immersed in the online world that nurtured Wikileaks than in Lebanese politics. The real surprise is that some seasoned observers would make the same mistake of transferring the Hollywood world of Wikileaks to the Lebanese context.

For example, the general director of Al-Akhbar Ibarhim Al-Amin ‘wondered critically why Hezbollah has been silent regarding the scandal of Ilyas Murr in Wikileaks’, as As’ad Abu Khalil put it. If you have been living in a nuclear bunker for the past few weeks, the documents published in Al-Akhbar revealed that the Minister of Defence and Deputy PM Murr had given advice to Israel through American representatives on how to conduct an upcoming confrontation with Hezbollah, in addition to several other ‘juicy’ revelations. Al-Amin picked up on Murr hinting to the Americans that Imad Mughniyeh, a Hezbollah military leader who was assassinated in Damascus in 2008, masterminded the political assassinations of March 14 members. Al-Amin ended his article with a pertinent question about Hezbollah’s position regarding the leaks, in a sense qerrying the party's silence regarding the leaks.

But what are the revelations exactly? Lebanese leaders conspire against each other with foreign powers? Big surprise! This has been going on since the country was established, and everyone knows it. In fact, given the routine accusations of treason and the usual conspiracy scenarios, some of the politicians came out looking a bit less conspiratorial than the public would have normally assumed. The suggestion that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is politicised? Did we need the leaks to figure out that it was designed as a tool for political revenge and a stick with which to beat Syria?

But the real surprise to me is that so many observers still fail to comprehend the nature and limits of sectarian politics in Lebanon. The confessional system is based on mutual mistrust, it’s predisposed a priori towards the institutionalisation of suspicion. This is expressed in all the arrangements that mediate the relationships between the large confessions that control power-sharing. But the system can only function under a veneer of politeness that decrees that these antagonisms should never be expressed in public and should always be referred to metaphorically. Thus, we must all pretend that the May 7 events were not a blatant sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiites but a ‘political’ conflict. The 'unreported' sectarian nature of those events is clear to see through the various clips posted on Youtube by the different factions, that reveal this sectarianism far more than the media accounts did.
These well-nurtured relationships of mutual suspicion have always served to reinforce the power of confessional leaders, bringing them to the surface would in a curious way undermine this form of authority. Once the masks fall, there would be no way of managing those relationships through politics and the only option becomes war. Thus, when Al-Amin asks Hezbollah to recognise the leaks and act on them he’s asking for Hezbollah to wage war. Thankfully, Hezbollah’s leadership has the wisdom to avoid such a prospect.

Furthermore, those who expected the leaks to have a bigger impact have underestimated the extent to which the ‘solution’ to the STL indictment dilemma has now been handed over to the Saudis and the Syrians. The Lebanese factions have little control over this process now, aside from their ‘wish lists’ that they have left with their guardians in Damascus and Riyadh. Nothing else can explain the complicity of both political camps to maintain the current internal inertia in the face of the pressing urgency of this political impasse. We will no doubt create a new distribution of roles once the dust has settled, ushering in a new era of externally-sponsored coexistence. The scandal here is not the leaks, but the miserable inability of Lebanese leaders to sort out their own problems.

But there’s a wider problem here that concerns the leaks themselves. Despite all the excited buzz we’re hearing about ‘the truth’, the leaks are not the truth. They are how American diplomats view the world. That in itself is not the truth about anything. Information on its own does not become a truth unless placed within a coherent narrative about what their meaning and significance is. Such narrative has been remarkable in its absence in this case. This is not to say that they should not be made public, but the mere fact of making them public on its own does not make them relevant without a coherent narrative.

And it’s in this last aspect that Al-Akhbar has failed to use the leaks in a meaningful way; it merely replicated what Wikileaks did on a smaller scale. Even the layout of the leaks page on Al-Akhbar resembled a shopping website instead of a newspaper: masses of data categorised for easy consumption. In its eagerness to modernise, Al-Akhbar has tended to replicate uncritically trends in the Leftist Western press at the expense of engaging with the Lebanese political context. It would do well to question its political affiliations in this scandal-resistant nation and perhaps look more critically at the events of the last few years. We have enough information to make judgments about Lebanese politics; what we lack is the principled stance not the data.

In solidarity, critically, with Al-Akhbar.

Consensus: the authoritarian alternative

2010-11-22T15:16:00.000-08:00

If you believe the hype, Lebanon is heading fast towards another crisis. A round of civil violence is lurking around the corner, or perhaps a renewed confrontation with Israel. For the seasoned conspiracy theorists, even a double whammy is in the cards: an Israeli attack in parallel with civil strife according to some plan being hatched by the tireless forces of imperialism. We’ve been there before of course, at countless times. Typically, the Lebanese instinct manifests itself in two ways under those circumstances: firstly emphasise the need for consensus to ward off the external danger, and secondly seek the intervention of external agents to help us avoid an explosion.

The Lebanese factions being what they are, it never occurs to their leaders that it might be within their capacity to sort out their differences by themselves. It also never occurs to them that any solutions orchestrated by the regional powers will inevitably invite more intervention and consequently erode whatever little remains of the national sovereignty. The Doha accord, the last time the Lebanese leaders kissed and made up in a foreign capital, instituted a bizarre precedent that seems to be taking hold. It swept aside all democratic norms and introduced the logic of consensus.

Post-Doha, consensus meant that the results of parliamentary elections should not be taken literally; they are merely guidelines as to how power should be shared. Lebanon, the theory went, is too diverse to be governed by one side. But that arrangement that brought bitter enemies into the same cabinet was not going to last, especially given the looming STL indictment which might point the finger at Hezbollah. So, the current arrangement seems to have exhausted itself, and we find ourselves awaiting a Saudi-Syrian agreement that will tell us how our country should be run for the next few years.

When I criticised the attempts at consensus-building in a previous article and blamed March 14 for not using their parliamentary majority effectively in order to govern on the basis of their democratic mandate, some saw this as a desire to see March 14 dominate its opponents. As it happens, I am not a big fan of March 14, neither of March 8. The point is that March 14 won the elections on the basis of a specific platform which has now all but disappeared. If March 14 acknowledges this failure, then its leaders should resign and hand power over. Interestingly, this is a situation that neither they nor their opponents want to see happen.

This peculiar predicament is a product of a little understood aspect of the Lebanese political system. Democracy is not a pretence as many assume, otherwise nobody would bother spending all this energy on elections and there would be no surprises like the significant shifts that occurred in the last elections. The democratic system, despite all its faults, can operate within a limited capacity. Increasingly, we have even seen the bigger groupings particularly, especially the Future movement and the Free Patriotic movement, field wide lists of candidates in diverse constituencies that would normally be reserved for their opponents.

So democracy, or to be accurate the electoral aspect of it, is given a limited space to run its course and is tolerated for a while as long as all parties are content. But once a crisis looms, the system goes into paralysis. The immediate effect of this is a shift of constituency: politicians become confessional leaders drawing their support not from their success in the elections but from their sectarian bases. To all intents and purposes, this is effectively like dissolving the parliament and switching to a more primitive form of representation. It’s not by accident that at times like this, the National Dialogue council, un-elected and paying no attention to popular disposition, comes to the fore.

In the name of coexistence, the democratic process is suspended until a solution can be found. This clearly says that democracy is possible but is not a luxury that we can afford at critical junctures. Effectively, this means that the one thing that we can suspend at those times is the popular will. A paternalistic attitude emerges and we are violently thrown back into a time when our leaders must be trusted a priori. Curiously, we are content to allow this to happen because it is done in our names and for our protection. Not as citizens but as sectarian beings whose representation occurs at a much more primeval level.

Consensus resurfaces at those moments to imply that there are sacrifices and compromises being made in our interest. But effectively we are asked to endorse authoritarian measures taken without our participation and that explicitly contradict our political aspirations. The current crisis that was triggered by the STL indictment is now being gradually transformed into a discussion about the nature of the system itself and a different power-sharing arrangement that increases Shiite representation. The usual horse-trading will now commence until a satisfactory arrangement is found, and the ‘price’ is now being publicly discussed in the media. Remember that when this consensus emerges: it is the consensus of the political classes against the citizens of Lebanon and nothing to be celebrated.

In defence of elitism: the American University of Beirut

2010-11-22T04:34:00.000-08:00

I was amused to read this philistine attack on the American University of Beirut by Jana Nakhal in Al-Akhbar newspaper, The AUB and Beirut: One Side Love. Nakhal, 'an urban-planning engineer' (sic), subjects the AUB to a shrill anti-colonial examination, uncovering it in the process as an 'accelerating factor in the popular acceptance of colonial ideas, tastes and concepts'. (Presumably things like engineering, medicine and architecture which colonialism forced us to accept).

Nakhal is upset that the AUB seems to be cut-off from its urban context and is not interested in having any meaningful interaction with the areas that surround it. Its students apparently impose their tastes on the areas around and 'take nothing in return'. The proof? None of the students pick up the distinctive local accent of the area! The irony of course is when the AUB was established in 1866, the neighbourhoods around did not even exist. The construction of the university campus in what was then a forested area sparked off the urban development of the neighbouring areas.

The wall that surrounds the campus irks Nakhal; it is a physical barrier between the university and the city but, aside from security, the wall has an important symbolic role. It marks a space that is dedicated for learning and the pursuit of knowledge and one in which a different set of rules apply. This separation does not imply lack of concern for the preoccupations of the city dwellers but it creates a distance necessary for critical examination.

Higher education thrives on challenging students’ assumptions and worldviews and on providing them with the critical tools to develop their own thinking and ideas. The contemporary obsession with relevance and self-reinforcement is patronising and ultimately counter-productive. Nakhal is echoing not only this contemporary bias but also a certain mindset in Lebanon and the Arab world that is deeply suspicious of ‘alien’ ideas. This rhetoric has traditionally relied on pseudo-Marxist and anti-colonial ideas to justify the insecurity brought about by exposure to modernity at the end of Ottoman rule.

I was not surprised then that Nakhal quoted Frantz Fanon to expose the AUB as the guardian of imperial values: ‘The colonial-bourgeois thinkers in universities persistently uphold essential Western values’. I am not quite sure what those values are, but I think she might be talking about Western concepts like gravity and the laws of thermo-dynamics. They always sounded suspiciously ethno-centric to me. It’s also amusing to hear the resonance of Radio Moscow in the mindless repetition of words like ‘bourgeois’ and ‘colonial’, but let’s not forget that Al-Akhbar’s dedication to the cause of international revolution dictates certain stylistic preferences.

But why the AUB and why now? Why subject the most successful academic institution in Lebanon to this rabid attack? The AUB throve despite severely adverse conditions because of its independence and its dedication to excellence and academic rigour. It works precisely because it was not swallowed up by the Lebanese system and because it managed to fend off the intrusions of the Lebanese ‘groups’ and their lumpish presence. It is elitist in the best sense of the word, creating a space for critical thinking and debate that thousands have enjoyed and benefited from.

Back in the early 90s, when I was a student at the AUB, I had to watch the sad spectacle of the great historian Kamal Salibi being rudely forced out of his class by an Amal movement ‘operative’ who was a constant presence on campus. That, and the many assassination and kidnappings that took place on campus, was the consequence of subjecting the AUB to the power of the Lebanese ‘people’ or the thugs that represent them at any rate. Salibi’s fault was that he wasn’t sufficiently moved by whatever grievance that Amal deemed we must all commemorate to stop his class.

But Nakhal seems to be oblivious to this troubled history; if the AUB doesn’t embrace Uncle Deek then it’s committing a sin against our folk. She is particularly affronted that an AUB student mispronounces ‘keshek’, that staple of Lebanese diet that embodies our identity and our customs. I was reminded of the diatribe at the end of Ziad Rahbani’s Shi Fashel in which the folklore creature chides the Lebanese for their sentimental attachment to their traditions and rejection of modernity. Ziad’s sentiments are of course unapologetic: he is against the backwardness represented by this sentimental attachment to our rural past.

Three decades later, Nakhal wants us to embrace this backward heritage and undermine the independence of our greatest seat of learning. Time to celebrate the keshek.

Suspended democracy and Lebanon’s paralysis

2010-11-08T05:40:00.000-08:00

During Saad Hariri’s recent visit to London, he was questioned by a journalist about the failure to ratify the national budget for the past five years. The ‘opposition’ press has dedicated significant coverage to the subject of the budget during the past few months, especially that its ratification is linked to the funding of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. In any other country, not ratifying the budget for 5 years would be a serious problem. In Lebanon, it’s a minor transgression, as Hariri’s matter-of-fact response indicated. The budget issue is one expression of the perpetual crisis that the Lebanese political system has been going through for years, but it’s only a symptom of the willingness of the political elites to suspend democratic mechanisms whenever convenient.

It’s easy to forget, but the last parliamentary elections took place less than a year and half ago. Public attention has shifted to other matters, but there’s no doubt that significant effort has gone into undermining the results of those elections since then. As bad as elections are in Lebanon, they still represent the choices of the Lebanese people. Characteristically, the political class turned away from the voters as soon as the elections were over in order to seek the approval of another set of constituents: the foreign powers that sponsor them in one form or another. This is not a critique of the ‘former opposition’ only; the March 14 coalition has behaved in an even less responsible manner by squandering its parliamentary majority and then relying on regional and international powers to come to its rescue.

Of course the sight of Michel El Murr being carried over his supporters’ shoulders is a strong motive to lose faith in democracy, but disengagement is not the solution. The real problem is that we ‘the people’ are willing to collude in the process of transferring decision making responsibility from our elected representatives to external powers. We’re content to watch the sequence of events unfold like a TV series that we have no control over. And we’re willing to accept the mercurial realignments within the parliament as if politicians once elected are free to change course with no accountability.

On the last point, the ‘former opposition’, a ridiculous concept in its own right, now claims that Walid Jumblatt’s political turnaround has given it a parliamentary majority. Why not pass a motion of no confidence in the government then? And why is March 14 not using its parliamentary majority to reassert its authority and public support if it really still commands such a majority? Why are both sides content to avoid democratic processes while they await an externally-inspired ‘solution’? The cynical response is that those choices are not possible ‘because of the sensitivity of the Lebanese system.’ God forbid we should offend the sensitivity of our delicate politicians, but this is more of a case of aversion to democracy that sensitive dispositions. The response of the public should not be disengagement but demanding adherence to democratic processes.

Saad Hariri: The limits of politics

2010-11-04T06:32:00.000-07:00

I met the Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri for the first time this week, when I went to a talk he gave at the London School of Economics. The talk itself was very general. Hariri discussed the Arab Peace Initiative which was first proposed at the Beirut Summit for Arab leaders in 2002, and explained the need for peace in the Middle East which he asserted that Lebanon’s internal stability depends on. He touched on the economic achievements of his and the preceding government and outlined how building on those achievements is vital to fulfilling the aspirations of the Lebanese people.

Hariri did not address the subject of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in his talk, but there were several questions about it from the audience. Hariri admitted to understanding and even sharing the anxiety of the anti-tribunal camp but said that, ultimately, this issue has to be resolved through dialogue, not confrontation. Hariri was diplomatic in his choice of words, but he did question the reasons for the strong opposition to the tribunal. I thought he might be alluding to the possible involvement of some of the opponents of the tribunal in the assassination of his father, Rafik Hariri.

I’ve been perplexed for a while now by the defensive position that the tribunal has placed Hariri and his political allies into. The tribunal was meant to represent international protection for the 14th of March alliance, but now the situation has reversed and they are spending most of their energy defending the tribunal. So I put that question to Hariri without specifically mentioning the STL: Why has 14th March allowed itself to retreat into a defensive position instead of reviving Hariri Sr.’s economic and political project and consequently winning popular support through politics and development?

I must admit Hariri’s reply was interesting, although not surprising. Hariri talked about the need to pause and take stock instead of charging forward. The real reason of course being the consensual nature of politics in Lebanon: Had 14th of March pushed its political project at the same pace, it would have alienated a large segment of the Lebanese. He used the metaphor of the 14th of March demonstration itself to explain this point: Many Lebanese were at Martyrs’ Square that day, but many others were watching with anxiety. Hariri’s response seemed to stress the need to include those left behind.

But this is precisely my argument with all of the Lebanese faction leaders: Consensus-building for them is understood as a process that is conducted outside the democratic process. We’ve had a national dialogue council for a number of years now; it was intended to provide the mechanism for this consensus-building. Like everything else in Lebanon, it had to have the right balance of representation between confessional groups, geographic areas and political parties. But isn’t that why we have a parliament? This gathering is little more than a tribal council of elders, an un-constitutional body that operates outside the normal rules of politics.

Hariri’s reply to my question, much like the absurdity of having a council of elders in a parliamentary democracy, indicates the limits of politics in Lebanon. The confessional leaders inherently accept the limitations imposed on them by the nature of the Lebanese system. Political success must always be kept in check and balanced with confessional arrangements.

I found it very ironic then that Hariri, when replying to my question, made the distinction between 'national leaders' and 'confessional leaders'. He talked of his intention to emulate his father in that respect and become a leader for all the Lebanese. This does not square up with his ready acceptance of the limits of politics in Lebanon and his willingness to accept consensus-building as a process to be conducted between confessional leaders. This is neither democratic nor politically savvy.

Hariri Pop Idol

2010-11-03T07:30:00.000-07:00

By Joseph El-Khoury, re-published with permission from Arabdemocracy

Yesterday night I came face to face with Saad Hariri for the first time. I had shaken hands in a past life with his late father more than 12 years ago and was looking forward to draw a comparison between father and son. The Lebanese Embassy in London provided the backdrop to an evening reception where the banking industry was overrepresented. Having sampled the canapés and exchanged opinions on the resilience of the Lebanese economy, they laid down their glasses to clap in their hero as he appeared past a group of heavily botoxed ladies. A friend pointed out that Saad Hariri looked a defeated man. Perhaps I thought! I rather found that his tone, posture and demeanour still revealed a degree of discomfort in his role, despite the 5 years of experience as heir to his father’s political legacy.

There is no doubting the young prime minister's accessibility. A credit to someone raised in the ivory towers of wealth and in a region where leaders’ interactions with the common people is rehearsed up to the smallest handshake. As the ceremony was coming to an end, we had full access to the figure if not the man. The bodyguards lay off a bit as he was allowed to bathe among the small crowd of socialites. Some chose to immortalise the moment by posing with him to which he complied with ease. Another friend initiated an absurd conversation in English. The choice of language and topic was probably triggered by nerves but Mr Hariri failed to pick up on it in any way, shape or form. In keeping with the overall evening, his performance remained as flat as a half full can of fizzy drink. Neither the cliché reference to the Lebanon of brotherly love and chic restaurants could turn things around or the lacklustre use of colloquial Arabic to establish rapport with an audience unsure of its own values. In my mind, the unavoidable comparison was one between Hariri and his archrival (in a comic book superheroes kind of way) Mr Nasrallah, who also falls back on colloquial Arabic to emphasize his well-articulated points. The difference being that Mr Nasrallah manages to be entertaining in his sarcasm, buoyed by the confidence of those who are driven by ideology and have the means to implement it. Mr Hariri could be excused for failing to motivate a haphazard group not necessarily committed to his political vision when Mr Nasrallah commands blind authority among hundreds of thousands. This has not always been the case and yesterday’s interaction highlights the breakdown in the contract between the March 14th leaders and their former power base: A contract that was laid down in 2005 and undermined through errors, retreats, betrayals and inconsistencies for which Hariri and his band of courtesans share responsibility. The lack of vision and the absence of a consistent message might explain why the claps were half-hearted and the eyes firmly on the trays of Lebanese delicacies being passed around by oblivious waiters.

The Prince and CABE 2.0: An even less accountable version

2010-10-28T05:00:00.000-07:00

It's emerged that the The Prince of Wales’ architectural charity, the Prince’s Foundation , is contemplating plans to replace CABE as the body in charge of carrying out design reviews. Instead of getting rid of this meddling and intrusive process of policing architectural design, we're now facing the prospect of an even more stylistically rigid organisation heading it. The haphazard nature of the government's decisions leaves the space open for powerful organisations to lobby for this role instead of handing the power back to planning departments as I had argued before. Councils are democratically-elected and accountable bodies, unlike Prince Charles and his foundation which are medieval relics.

The chief executive of the Prince’s Foundation Hank Dittmar tried to deny accusations that his organisation would only favour traditional architecture: “To be credible, it would have to have democratic, independent judgement. We would have to have a panel that was balanced and not exclusively traditional architects.” I am not worried about such a prospect. What I am worried about is the un-democratic nature of review panels.

Architects could build neo-Gothic hotels in central London for all I care. It's time that we learned that the tyranny of taste is not the way to ensure good design. But what we should fight for is the right of architects to make judgments about what they think is right and wrong without subjecting them to an extra layer of scrutiny. We should also give planners with the confidence to champion good schemes and not undermine their authority through committees of the great and the good. This new authoritarian outfit should be resisted before it turns into a reality.

You can watch a debate I had with Hank Dittmar here. The session was hosted by the Urban Design Group and entitled 'Building Urban Communities - What is a City?' I think it's a good preview of the clash of ideas between the authoritarian and backward-looking decision makers and those of us who have an aspirational outlook.

In defence of factory farming

2010-10-25T09:46:00.000-07:00

Jason Smith makes a very good argument in defence of factory farming in response to the Compassion in World Farming (CIWF) campaign against a proposed super dairy at Nocton in Lincolnshire, England. Jason takes on several of the misguided arguments that drive antagonism towards large-scale farming. His article is a good accompaniment to my article against the misplaced faith in urban farming Grow Your Own: Urban Farming: The future of food or Arcadia on the cheap?

I liked in particular Jason's debunking of 'natural' farming:

"People who argue that super dairies are unnatural should realise that there is nothing natural about farming at all. There is nothing natural about the landscape of the British countryside and there is nothing natural about humans drinking milk. Human beings had been around some 140,000 years before they gradually stopped being hunter-gatherers and took up cultivating crops and animals. The British countryside that we see today was largely created between 1760 and 1820 as part of the agricultural revolution that saw the end of the open-field system and the subsistence farming that accompanied it."

When will people learn that the romantic views of nature and of the past are not the way to solve our problems today?

The Historian turned Oracle: Walid Raad's Miraculous Beginnings

2010-10-21T08:18:00.000-07:00

The Whitechapel Gallery in London is hosting an exhibition of Walid Raad's work over the past twenty years entitled Miraculous Beginnings. The exhibition features the work that Raad is well-known for, with the Atlas Group project, as well as his more recent work. It is a genuinely fascinating exhibition and I highly recommend visiting it, it runs until the end of the year.

Culture Wars published my review of the exhibition. There's a clear departure in style and content best summed as 'the Historian turned Oracle'. Hopefully, this will intrigue you enough to visit. Raad's work embodies the complexities of modern Lebanon and its history and any attempts at representing it. What more can you ask for?

A different type of determinism

2010-10-21T07:57:00.000-07:00

My colleague in ManTowNHuman Alastair Donald makes a very compelling argument in favour of rejecting 'happy clappy architecture' in his blog at The Independent today.

'Happiness is the latest Big Idea amongst policymakers and social scientists. And given architects now justify design almost entirely in terms of delivering social policy, it was probably only a matter of time before attentions turned to shaping our feelings.'

'Ultimately, it seems there’s little genuine interest in creating the possibility for people to pursue their own happiness, but rather using design to cultivate conformism with other agendas. It’s surely time to reject happy clappy architecture.'

Alastair also echoes an argument that I made several times, most recently in my essay on happiness in architecture, that the popularity of 'designing behaviour' accepts a form of environmental determinism. When I accused David Harvey of pandering to environmental determinism by suggesting that there's 'geographic subconscious' at play in modern society, I was flooded with a barrage of pedantic comments claiming that I misunderstood Harvey who had indeed made his own critique of determinism. Someone even hit back by suggesting we discuss 'the effect of suburbia on the political impotence of the middle class in the US'. To my mind, this is the clearest example of determinism I can think of.

But an important distinction must be made here: we are not talking about evolutionary determinism but about a form of social determinism that is even more problematic. The acceptance of 'nudge' policies is a good example of this, as Alastair rightly points out. Evolutionary psychology has been utilised to provide the theoretical framework for this new paradigm and to give it a scientific gloss. Many 'social determinists' are critical of this 'scientific' approach but they seem oblivious to the convergence between their own thinking and that of evolutionary psychology. Namely, that they agree on limits to human agency that they see as beyond our control.

The most patronising and dismissive manifestation of this argument is the 'brainwashing' idea: people are too taken by the system to realise what their own good is. Not surprisingly, this idea is more popular with the left, but this popularity is a clear expression of the left's failure to connect with large sections of society. Rather than being self-critical and understanding how it lost touch with the masses, it turns to blaming the people for being too stupid or brain-washed. Of course, the idea is rarely expressed in this vulgar form, but the assumptions behind many of the arguments we hear today stem from those exact sentiments.

The convergence between evolutionary psychology and social theory finds its expression in behavioral design. Let's call that spatial determinism.

‘ Il est interdit d’ interdire’ - Ban the bans!

2010-10-21T07:07:00.000-07:00

Josie Appleton write a great article today in Spiked about the new movement in Spain fighting against the smoking bans: 'Meet the Spaniards fighting to stub out authoritarianism'. At a time when most people are looking back nostalgically at May '68, few people remember that they were motivated by the spirit of freedom. This was clearly expressed in the slogan ‘Il est interdit d’ interdire’ or 'to ban is forbidden!' The Spanish movement adopted a similar slogan ‘Prohibido prohibir’, as a reminder of what the real issue with the smoking bans is.

Appleton makes several interesting points, but I liked in particular the distinction that those behind the movement are careful to make: this is not about smokers against non-smokers but everyone against the authoritarian and intrusive state that wants to regulate even the most basic aspects of social interaction. In all likelihood, smoking in Europe will disappear within a few generations but the principle is well-worth fighting for.

'Cabe was architect of its own demise'

2010-10-21T06:57:00.000-07:00

Amanda Baillieu echoes some of my thoughts on why CABE should be abolished in her BD blog. Like me, she thinks that CABE is a design police force, although she stretched the metaphor a bit: 'It was a design police force run out of the equivalent of the Kremlin.' She also thought that the functions of CABE should be part of the planning system and not as an external agency. Few people today would agree that 'planners aren’t there to tell us what’s good design', but I wholeheartedly embrace this sentiment. Fat chance of this happening.

Now that the fate of CABE has been decided, I must stress that it was abolished for the wrong reasons and not part of a major reform of the planning system. The consequence will be that CABE will be reborn in a different shape, less costly but as intrusive.

A thought for all those losing their jobs, we must express our solidarity with them. They are not responsible for CABE's actions but will face the consequences of New Labour's flippancy and authoritarianism and the coalition's crisis-management mentality which they're attempting to pass off as policy.

مسيرات الخروج على الدولة: في انحسار الطائفية و تبلور الهويات الثقافية

2010-10-10T02:27:00.000-07:00

يكاد خروج الأهل على الدولة أن يكتمل في لبنان، عقبا على وضاح شرارة الذي أرخ بدايات هذه النزعة في معرض تحليله لمواجهات عام 1973 بوصفها "فصل من تأريخ الحروب الملبننة". تغليب سلطة الأهل و العلاقات الأهلية على الاجتماع السياسي و قوام الدولة كان بنظر شرارة هدفا أساسيا من أهداف الحركة الوطنية تم تحقيقه من خلال اتفاق الطائف و تم إرساء دعائمه خلال السنوات التي تلت الاتفاق. لوهلة بعد اغتيال الرئيس رفيق الحريري و الانتفاضة الشعبية التي تلته بدا إن لبنان قد بدأ يخطو خطوات واثقة باتجاه عكس مفاعيل تغليب النزعة الأهلية على قوام الدولة غير إن سلسلة الأحداث التي تلت ذلك المنعطف التاريخي بينت مدى صعوبة هذه المهمة إلى أن جاءت أحداث السابع من أيار لتنهي عمليا هذه المسيرة و تعيد تثبيت دعائم الحكم الأهلي. و ليس تفصيلا إن تلك الدعائم تقوم بشكل كبير على التشكيك بالدولة و أهدافها و أساليبها ووضعها بشكل مستمر تحت مجهر التدقيق بوصفها موضع شك و ريبة خصوصا من خلال علاقاتها بالدول الأخرى و النظام العالمي. و ليس اعتكاف المعارضين عن إمساك زمام الدولة الذي كان بميسرهم قبيل الانتخابات النيابية إلا دليلا على عدم الثقة بالدولة نفسها و ما تمثله، لا فقط الأطراف السياسية التي تعاقبت على تدبير شؤون السلطة التنفيذية.

و ليس من المبالغة بشيء القول بان هذه العلاقة المضطربة مع مفهوم الدولة هي وجه من أوجه التخلف عن الالتحاق بركب الحداثة و أزمة الفرد في مجتمعاتنا الذي لا يزال يعاني من تسلط العلاقات الأهلية و حضور الماضي الفظ و ثقل وطأته. غير أن هذه العلاقة شهدت تحولات كبيرة خلال السنين المنصرمة أدت إلى تحول نوعي في كيفية إنتاج الخطاب الأهلي كبديل و نقيض لمفهوم الدولة الجامعة. تميزت علاقات الجماعات اللبنانية مع بعضها البعض و مع الدولة تاريخيا بتسليم دور الريادة في الاجتماع السياسي إلى الطوائف المسيحية عموما و الموارنة خصوصا و معه دور مخاطبة الغرب و الالتحاق بالحداثة. كان مشروع الحركة الوطنية في بداية الحرب الأهلية يمثل تحديا لهذه المهمة أو بالأحرى للتفويض المستتبع منها بإدارة شؤون البلاد و القبض على زمام الحكم. غير إن الهدف كما تبين لم يكن اخذ البلاد إلى نظام أكثر ديمقراطية و شفافية بل إلى تكريس سلطة الجماعات على النظام و تدوين أسس محاسبته من خارج المؤسسات في صميم المواثيق و الأعراف و جعل الشك و الريبة أسسا لهذه العلاقة لا عوارض تنشا من الاختلاف السياسي. هذه العلاقة بالأساس تقضي على السياسة كحلبة تنازع الأفكار و المفاهيم و تحيلها هيكلا شكليا فارغا.

ما تغير بعد الحرب هو تطوير مختلف الجماعات اللبنانية لقدراتها الخاصة للاتصال بالحداثة عبر مناظريها و مفاهيمها و بمعزل عن الدولة و الدور المحوري التي كانت تلعبه الطائفة المارونية التي فقدت قدرتها على الريادة في هذا المجال و إن كانت لا تزال تحتل مركزا أساسيا في الاقتصاد و الاجتماع السياسي. و ترافق بروز دور الجماعات مع انحسار الأفكار الكونية في السياسة و الاجتماع و الثقافة و نشوء أفكار مغايرة تقوم على إعلاء شان الخصوصيات الثقافية و تبلورها في شكل المجتمعات المتعددة الثقافات الذي تبنتها الكثير من البلدان كنماذج تنظيم اجتماعي و سياسي. و لعب انحسار دور أفكار الحداثة و انتشار أفكار ما بعد الحداثة دورا كبيرا في التنظير لهذه المجتمعات و إعطائها الأطر القانونية و السياسية. بدا جليا في الدول الغربية التي نحت نحو هذا النموذج إن خطوط الفصل بين الجماعات ازدادت حدة نتيجة لهذا النمط في تنظيم المجتمع فازداد تقوقع الجماعات على أنفسها و انعزالها عن المجتمع بشكله الأوسع. المفارقة تكمن بان توفر وسائل الاتصال بالحداثة و قدرة الجماعات على ولوجها منفردة زادت في إضعاف الأواصر الاجتماعية الطوعية و الفردية و أنتجت قواسم حادة بين الجماعات عبر إعلاء شان الهوية الثقافية و الاحتفال بها على أنقاض الأفكار الكونية الجامعة.

لم يشذ الاجتماع اللبناني عن هذا الاتجاه العام فبدأ التفكك ألقسري الذي فرضته الحرب يأخذ شكلا مغايرا بعد انتهائها. فرغم عودة بعض المناطق إلى الاختلاط ترافق هذا المنحى مع ازدياد حدة الفوارق بين الجماعات اللبنانية و أخذها أشكال ثقافية و اجتماعية و سياسية دفعها انعدام الحواجز المادية إلى العلن بشكل فظ. تظهر هذه الفوارق بشكل حاد اليوم في خيارات الترفيه و التسوق و طرق استعمال المساحات العامة التي تختلف بشكل جذري بين جماعة و أخرى. قد يكون أكثر هذه النماذج وضوحا هو الضاحية الجنوبية التي تطورت بشكل يختلف كل الاختلاف عن المناطق الأخرى تحت أنظار و رعاية حزب الله الذي يضع معايير محددة لما هو مقبول أو غير مقبول من أنماط الاختلاط العام و الترفيه و التسوق و السكن. و ترافق هذا الانفصال المادي مع ابتعاد ذهني و نفسي يكاد يكون أكثر حدة و يمكن لمسه حين تسقط الأقنعة المهذبة على الانترنيت التي أنتجت بدورها فضائات متوازية ترتادها الجماعات اللبنانية على هواها. هذا الفضاء الافتراضي يشكل جزئا مهما من تطوير الجماعات اللبنانية لقدراتها على الاتصال بالحداثة بشكل مستقل و منظم يجاهد ليعزل أفراده عن العالم الأخر و يقوم بإعادة إنتاج و تقوية حدود الهوية الثقافية الواضحة التي لا تجد من ينتقدها في هذا الفضاء المُحتكر. كل الجماعات اللبنانية تمارس هذا التسلط على الهوية الثقافية التي تنتج خيارات سياسية واضحة لا مجال لمعارضتها لكونها في مقام البديهيات. قد ينفلت من هذه المعادلة أفراد لكنهم يفعلون ذلك كفتات اجتماع ينحى بثقله في اتجاه مغاير.

من الانعكاسات المهمة لهذا التفكك على الاجتماع اللبناني تعديه نطاق الطوائف و إن كانت لا تزال الأكثر فعالية في إنتاج ملامح الهوية الثقافية. فالخارجون عن طوائفهم لهم مجموعاتهم و فضائاتهم أيضا و إن لم تكتسب حتى ألان حدة الهويات الطائفية. فيصبح اليسار مثلا نادي ثقافي مهمته تعزيز هوية مريديه لا التغيير الاجتماعي و السياسي، وينتج المثليون فضائهم الخاص و يبتعدون عن الشعارات الواسعة نحو انتزاع حقوقهم كمجموعة واضحة المعالم، و يتوج هذا كله بمسيرة من اجل دولة علمانية يفضح اسمها باللغات الأجنبية هدفها الحقيقي بتكريس العلمانيين كالطائفة التاسعة عشر أو العشرين. هذه المسيرة المنقولة عن نموذج مسيرات المُثليين في الغرب تريد الاحتفال بالهوية العلمانية بوصفها خيارا فرديا و نمط عيش لا أساسا من أسس الدول الديمقراطية الحديثة ينبغي تكريسه في النصوص و الممارسة. كل ما سبق يشير بوضوح إلى انفراط عقد الاجتماع اللبناني و إعادة تشكيله كهويات ضيقة تعيش متجاورة لكن غير متلامسة. و يتلاشى بذلك دور الدولة و السياسة أكثر فأكثر ليفرغ الساحة لضوضاء الجماعات المتشرذمة التي تمارس كل منها سلطتها بإعاقة تطور الدولة التي لن يأتي إلا على حساب هذا التطلب الأهلي اللحوح.

ختاما، المطلوب اليوم هو العودة إلى السياسة بمعناها الأوسع الذي يقوم على تنازع الأفكار لا على تنافس الهويات، و إحلالها حكما بين اللبنانيين و وسيلة لدفع المجتمع نحو التقدم و كسر تسلط الجماعات على أفرادها. يفترض كل هذا الانعتاق من سلطة الماضي و ارثه الثقيل الذي يرزح على صدورنا، لا الاحتفال بالموروثات و تكريس سلطتها. و بالموازي يتطلب ذلك مشاريع تغيير واسعة لا مسيرات متشتتة تنحوا كل منها في اتجاه مغاير نحو تبلور هويات ضيقة و إن بدت خيارات عصرية بوصفها مستوردة من الغرب. قد يستفيد بعض محترفي التشكيك بمنطق الدولة من العودة إلى اللحظة التي سبقت انفجار الحروب الأهلية علهم يعون كم يشبه خطابهم اليوم الخطاب الذي مهد لذلك الانفجار و الذي قام على تغليب المنطق الأهلي على منطق الدولة. هل علينا أن نخوض الحرب مجددا تحت الشعارات نفسها كي نتعظ؟

Back to the Future: The Fate of Harirism

2010-10-06T07:05:00.000-07:00

Yesterday, Al-Akhbar newspaper published a story speculating about two possible outcomes to the current confrontation between Prime Minister Hariri and Hezbollah. In the first scenario, a Syrian-Saudi agreement allows Hariri to stay in power in return for blocking the awaited Special Tribunal for Lebanon indictment and withdrawing his backing of the tribunal. The second scenario will be put into action should the Saudi-Syrian agreement fail to materialise. Hezbollah would then move to replace Hariri through peaceful protests and the subsequent resignation of the 8th of March ministers from the cabinet.

Hariri’s refusal to implement the Saudi-Syrian agreement, still according to Al-Akhbar, would lead to Saudi pressure for him to resign, and be replaced by another person from the Hariri family or a candidate loyal to Saudi Arabia. In the absence of such an agreement, the collapse of the current government would be followed by the appointment of Bahij Tabbara or Leila El Solh as prime minister. Tabbara played important roles in the cabinets led by Rafik Hariri, while Leila El Solh has strong Sunni credentials and links with Saudi Arabia.

There’s no way of telling whether Al-Akhbar’s scenario has any credibility, but given that the newspaper has been acting as an important conduit for relaying Syrian wishes and political messages at an increasing frequency lately, the article could be seen as a reassuring message to the Sunni street. Hezbollah and Syria seem to be proposing transitional scenarios that lead to the abolition of the STL while preserving strong Sunni political presence. What’s remarkable about both scenarios is the 90s nostalgia that’s a common theme. Syria and Hezbollah seem to be proposing a return to the arrangements that prevailed then, with minor adjustments.

I had argued previously that the current confrontation between Hariri and Hezbollah is a prelude to a settlement that creates a new division of labour between the two and reintroduces Syrian control. The two scenarios discussed by Al-Akhbar don’t differ much in outcome from this hypothesis. At the end of the transitional period, Harirism would be maintained as a political and economic project under the leadership of Hariri himself, someone from his circles or a Sunni leader with business credentials. What is apparent is that the abolition of the STL is so important to Syria and Hezbollah to make them offer the continuation of Harirism as a project in return for its dissolution.

The 90s version of Harirism was based on the construction/resistance division of labour between Hariri the father and Hezbollah. This arrangement could be described in a different way: Back then, Harirism was concerned with mapping the future of Lebanon while Hezbollah acted as a guardian of its past. Hariri’s economic vision represented that future, while Hezbollah’s mythology prescribed the country’s historic identity and its Arab dimension. Hariri’s imagery was of Singapore and Hong Kong while Hezbollah’s imagery glorified toil in the land and a peasant lifestyle.

This renewed attempt at reviving the pre-Cedar Revolution version of Harirism and a political arrangement with Hezbollah ignores the crucial contradictions between those two outlooks. It also ignores the changes that both Harirism and Hezbollah underwent during the past five years. But it seems that, once again in Lebanon, political stability would be obtained at the expense of repressing manifest contradictions. Such an arrangement is certain to exclude many political groups, such as Aoun and the Lebanese Forces, from the decision-making circles. Will it then be a complete return to the 90s with the marginalisation of Christian leaders? Are the Lebanese people willing to relive that era once again?

A Victory for Big and Bold Architecture: Zaha Hadid wins the RIBA Stirling Prize

2010-10-02T12:25:00.000-07:00

Zaha Hadid has finally won the RIBA Stirling Prize today, for the MAXXI contemporary art museum in Rome. The Stirling Prize is the UK’s most prestigious architectural award and the choice of Hadid as winner is a bold decision that should be applauded. Zaha has been nominated three times without winning,. This year the jury finally recognised her achievements and the boldness of her designs.

The ‘public’ had favoured one of her opponents' designs, the Ashmolean Museum in Oxford, according to an RIBA poll. The Ashmolean Museum is a decent bit of design, however it is no match to Zaha’s MAXXI museum with distils several of her experimental ideas into one building. In awarding the prize to Hadid, the jury acknowledges her long term contribution to architecture and the perseverance that made her fight for her radical ideas over decades.

The MAXXI museum brings contemporary architecture to Rome in a spectacular way; Zaha’s approach to design was not compromised at all. Furthermore, at a time when there’s so much pressure for architecture to be subtle and discrete, her win is a victory for experimentation and ambition. The misanthropic brigade has lost this one. Well done Zaha.

ذاكرة جماعية أم تكريس سلطة الماضي على الحاضر؟

2010-09-29T00:20:00.000-07:00

كلما انتعش النقاش عن وسط بيروت و شركة سوليدير يأتي من يذكرك بمحي الذاكرة الجماعية الذي من المفترض إن مشروع إعادة إعمار بيروت قد مارسه. الغريب إن مفاهيم كهذا تجد طريقها بسرعة إلى النخب و المثقفين و يصبح تردادها فعل إيمان من دون تدقيق أو نقد افتراضاتها المستوردة بأغلبها. و إذا تقاطعت هذه المفاهيم مع ما قد يبدو سطحيا انه مواجهة للاحتكار و الرأسمالية بوجهها المعاصر و مشاريع النخب الحاكمة زاد رواجها و اكتسبت أبعادا يبدو و كأنها تدخلها في مصاف النقاش السياسي العام. لكن قليل من التأمل كاف لقلب هذه المعادلة و كشف الأسس المُحافظة التي تدفعها.
فالذاكرة الجماعية كالمسؤولية الجماعية هي أسطورة تستمد جاذبيتها من كونها استعارة مغرية لكنها تستمد سلطتها عبر تكريس سلطة الماضي على الحاضر. نقد حنة آرندت لمفهوم المسؤولية الجماعية اظهر إنها بالحقيقة تناقض مفهوم المسؤولية بمعناه الأوسع فتحميل قوم مسؤولية أفعال لم يرتكبوها يعني بالمقابل إعفائهم من المسؤولية عن أفعالهم إذا ما ارتبط مفهوم المسؤولية بإرث خارج قدرة الأفراد و الجماعات على تغييره. و بالمثل فان مفهوم الذاكرة الجماعية، الذي يستحيل تحديدها و تبيان ملامحها لأنها فكرة مجردة لا مدخل إليها بالممارسة، هي إعادة إنتاج لسلطة الماضي على الحاضر هربا من مسؤولية النقد و الاشتباك و استشراف ملامح المستقبل. و يعود رواج هذا المفهوم جزئيا إلى الخلط بين كتابة التاريخ و التوثيق بأبسط أشكاله. فكتابة التاريخ فعل نقدي غالبا ما يعبر عن الحال الراهن أكثر بكثير مما يكشف عن الماضي. لذلك يهرب الكثير من اللبنانيين من مهمة معقدة كهذه نحو التوثيق الذي يبدو سهلا بالمقارنة و عملا روتينيا لا مجال لتلاعب الذاتية به. في أكثر أشكاله تطرفا يأخذ فعل التوثيق هذا شكل المحافظة على النسيج المدني و الأبنية التاريخية كما يحبذ المثقفون أن يحصل في وسط بيروت. لكن من قال إن الإرث العثماني أو الفرنسي هو أكثر بلاغة من مدينة ننتجها اليوم على صورة حاجاتنا و أهوائنا؟ التمسك بالذاكرة الجماعية، التي لم يتفق اللبنانيون عليها أبدا، هو تهرب من المسؤولية و من المهمة التاريخية التي يواجهها كل مجتمع بإنتاج ثقافة و عمران يمثلان طموحاته. قد لا يعجبنا تصميم سوليدير لكن نقده يتطلب حكما صورة مغايرة تستمد قوتها من الواقع و الطموحات لا الاستنجاد بالماضي و تسليطه حاكما على الحاضر و المستقبل. هذا تقاعس يعبر فقط عن ضحالة الرؤيا لدى النخب الثقافية.

Sects and the City

2010-09-27T07:19:00.000-07:00

In my post ‘Hariri / Hezbollah: in search of a new division of labour’ I argued that the climate of fear being created in Lebanon today is a noisy background for the upcoming deal that will seal a power-sharing arrangement between the main political camps under a renewed Syrian patronage. I closed that post by saying ‘we, as always, remain as spectators in all of this.’ This isn’t a call for disengagement and cynicism about politics; on the contrary it’s a call for the Lebanese people to reject all the secret deals being made without our participation. But how can we express our political will in this crucial period as we watch the blatant abdication of responsibility by Lebanese leaders?

Firstly, we need to recognise that our current predicament is a product of our inability to banish sectarianism from our political interactions. Sectarianism is not a secondary feature of the Lebanese political system; it’s the main constituent that manifests itself in confessional arrangements. And five years after the ‘Cedar Revolution’, we need to recognise that the events that followed it have contributed to the strengthening of sectarian leaderships.

It might have seemed at the time that seeing Samir Geagea and Walid Jumblatt together meant that we’ve opened a new chapter in our history. Far from it, the alliances that were created after the assassination of Hariri were explicitly set up as coalitions between sectarian groups. This is as true of the Geagea – Hariri alliance as it is of the Aoun – Hezbollah front. The cumulative effect of all those sectarian arranged marriages was a further erosion of any potential for secular politics. It's remarkable to observe that some of the most promising secular leaders were either assassinated or sidelined in the aftermath of Cedar Revolution.

Beirut, as always, is the main battleground for sectarian confrontations. I don’t mean by that only the skirmishes in ‘mixed’ areas such as the Burj Abi Haidar incident, but the whole range of political manifestations starting with the March 8th and 14th demonstrations to the Riad El-Solh camp to May 7 events. It’s time that we see all those events for what they were: displays of the sectarian power struggles that further eroded any possibility of national unity.

Today, we are astoundingly still being asked to choose between the two camps that have contrived to create and sustain a poisonous atmosphere of mistrust and animosity over the past five years. In other words, we are being asked to supply the fuel for the battles that precede settlements between sectarian leaders. Isn’t it time that we reject those offers and think of other political alternatives?

As my friend Fatima commented on my previous post, we should learn the lessons of our history of power-sharing arrangements which had devastating consequences at every juncture. She reminds us that the nation came into being in 1943 on the back of such an arrangement and set a precedent that still prevails until today. She, however, chose to close with a pessimistic message: “In the midst of this turmoil I prefer to stick to this anecdotal rule -- better bear the repercussions of a divorce rather than live in a household of quarreling parents.”

But I would rather be optimistic, there’s no point to politics otherwise. Had I been a fan of political theatre, I would have called for us to marsh on Beirut and protest against the cynical attempts at creating an atmosphere of fear and against the deal that will be agreed without our approval. This would be one way to reclaim Beirut and challenge the sectarian hold over our national politics. But I fear that the sectarian machines are much more adept and prepared for those mass displays than the rest of us.

The end of this political era is an opportunity to develop alternative forms of politics that are grounded in secularism and aspirations not sectarianism and fear. But while we organise and prepare for that, we should realise that any choices we make between the two camps are inevitably choices between sectarian coalitions. Let’s start by rejecting the calls to choose the least disagreeable option. And, for God’s sake, let’s stop believing the fear scenarios that are being circulated in the media. It is ludicrous to think that there are 3000 members of Hezbollah with ‘long beards and long nails’ hiding in chalets in Christian areas. Stop patronising us.

The New Superhero on the Block: Syrian, Muslim and in a wheelchair

2010-09-27T01:52:00.000-07:00

The 'Silver Scorpion' as he is known is 'the brainchild of a group of disabled young Americans and Syrians who were brought together last month in Damascus by the Open Hands Initiative, a non-profit organization founded by U.S. philanthropist and businessman Jay T. Snyder.'

The appearance of the superhero has not been finalised, but these early sketches show 'a Muslim boy who lost his legs in a landmine accident and later becomes the Silver Scorpion after discovering he has the power to control metal with his mind.'

It's not known yet whether the superhero will be using his super powers in neighbouring Lebanon.

Am I the only one to think that calling an amputee 'scorpion' is cruelly ironic?

Read full story here.

UnCommon Wealth Games: Why the West loves to put India down

2010-09-23T07:27:00.000-07:00

The problems dogging the Commonwealth Games in India have been quickly seized upon by Western commentators and athletes as an opportunity to put India back in its place. It seems that when it comes to the West's anxiety about the Rising East, the latter can't do anything right. China was criticised for the Beijing Olympic Games being elaborate and excessive, and now India is getting grief for its lack of proper preparation. The collapse of the pedestrian bridge that highlighted those problems is a tragedy, but it's astounding how this event was then used cynically to mount a vitriolic campaign against India.

The 'awful squalor' in the athletes' village, as the Daily Mail helpfully described the conditions, has quickly come to the fore as evidence for the lack of proper preparations. For all we know, those pictures could be of one apartment, but I don't personally understand the reason for this outrage. Western governments and NGOs have been warning India of the dangers of development for years now, on the hypocritical pretext of 'not repeating our mistakes.' Mistakes like having modern infrastructure systems and ambitious housing schemes. In a sense, the state of the athletes' village reflects the expectations that the West likes India to have.

Furthermore, Indian slums have been made into a fetish and icons of poverty porn. They are seen as 'authentic' places where thriving communities can exist despite the poverty and lack of proper conditions. Why would Western athletes turn their noses up at the prospect of staying in such conditions for a few days? This is the image the West likes to portray of India and it's only fair that it should be served back to the West. Gap year students normally pay money and travel for long distances to stay in such conditions, taking pictures and writing about their experiences. The athletes shouldn't turn down the opportunity.

The irony in all of this is the 'commonwealth' bit. The situation is pretty much a product of the fact that the wealth is un-common. India is on its way to rectifying this, but it will take a long time and huge amount of effort to arrive at Western standards of wealth. Rather than cheering India for this effort, we've taken to trying to dissuade it from having such ambitions. It's only fair that we should be offered accommodation that matches to our expectations of India. The West's cynical attitude in seizing on this opportunity to put India back in its place is truly shocking.

The athletes could do with some Spartan spirit and put up with some discomfort. After the games, I suggest all aid agencies, NGOs and government personnel suggesting that India scale down its ambitions should be given a compulsory two-week holiday in the athletes' village as well. Let them experience what it's like.

Countdown to the return of Syrian troops? Jumblatt says so.

2010-09-22T14:30:00.000-07:00

Think I was exaggerating when I talked about the return of the Syrian patronage over Lebanon? Now Walid Jumblatt has declared his public support for the return of Syrian troops. This is an excerpt from his conversation with Michael Young:

“We’re heading toward civil war if things remain as they are,” Jumblatt told me this week.

“What about the Syrians?” I asked.

“We should stop this fixation on the Syrians. They can’t do anything if the situation begins deteriorating; they don’t have troops on the ground,” he replied.

“But they would like to,” I said.

“And why not, I would support this,” Jumblatt interjected; “This is not a nation but a collection of tribes. You can quote me.”

Like with anything else that Jumblatt says, there are several layers and interpretations. This could be just a scare tactic or his way of showing genuine concern over the prospect of a civil war. Quite who will fight the civil war against Hezbollah is not clear to me, despite the ridiculous news stories about the Lebanese Forces and other parties acquiring military capabilities. Any repeat of the May 7, 2008 events is likely to see a quick Hezbollah victory. But then what? It will be a victory that the party does not want or need. Hezbollah is more careful than anyone else not to find itself in this position again. The return of Syrian patronage will avoid the prospect of such an escalation, but the physical return of the troops will not be required this time.

Hariri / Hezbollah: In search of a new division of labour

2010-09-21T07:15:00.000-07:00

The political fluctuations in Lebanon are often reported through meteorological metaphors. This is partially due to the fact that we have as much control over politics as we do over the weather. If the media is to be believed these days, rough storms are heading our way. Allegations of impending coups from one side are reciprocated by allegations about secret conspiracies with the west and Israel from the other. The truth, as usual, is much less dramatic.

It is easy to get carried away with the shrill tone of political reporting and rhetoric, but it’s often forgotten that this is usually part of the political jostling before anticipated settlements. The big headline for this period is the precise nature of the political arrangement that will ensue from Syria’s return as the main ‘player’ on the Lebanese scene. Saad Hariri’s exoneration of Syria and his statement about the political accusations that implicated it in the assassination of his father has created the ground conditions for Syria’s renewed patronage over Lebanon, but the shape of this stewardship is yet to be worked out.

Hariri and Hezbollah are effectively engaged in a power struggle to ensure the most advantageous positions within this arrangement. But this is not an open ended struggle; it’s more of an attempt at judging what will be possible under this new paradigm. All the talk of coups and conspiracies is part of the usual background noise that precedes such resolutions.

It’s worth remembering Hassan Nasrallah’s statement on the eve of Burj Abi Haidar clashes in which he declared that Hezbollah can overthrow the government in the parliament and does not need to agitate on the street in order to achieve this objective. The one thing that prevents Hezbollah and its allies from seizing power is Syrian influence. The blunt question to ask is if Hezbollah really believed in all the allegations about their opponents’ collusion with Israel, then why is it letting them run the country?

Let’s remember that the previous arrangement that ended the civil war and dictated how the country was run for a decade and a half was also orchestrated through a Saudi-Syrian agreement, albeit with a much larger role for the US at the time. The arrangement that ensued from the Taif Agreement created a division of labour between Hezbollah and Hariri the father, famously known as the development/resistance formula. In other words, Hariri was charged with development and reconstruction while Hezbollah handled the resistance against Israel.

Part of the explanation for the tension we are witnessing today is that this formula is not easy to resurrect for various reasons. For starters, the strict division of labour is not adequate any longer. Hezbollah has been increasingly more active in reconstruction and development since 2006, and it has had several achievements on that front. (Helped with the flow of Qatari and Iranian funds.) Hariri’s intelligence apparatus meanwhile has had various successes in discovering Israeli spy rings and arresting high-profile agents. Their roles have become increasingly overlapping.

This is partially more relevant in the case of Hezbollah because Hariri’s spy catcher apparatus is not an integral part of his political project. Hezbollah’s role in fighting Israel on the other hand cannot be expressed as aggressively as it used to be anymore. The 2006 war is still seen as a victory by the Party but, as Nasrallah remarked afterwards, the cost was quite high. Despite the talk of war that we constantly hear from both sides, it’s unlikely that Hezbollah or Israel see any strategic gains in any major confrontations anymore.

Hezbollah’s recently opened Museum of Resistance in Mleeta illustrates the nature of this new phase in Hezbollah’s existence. It is an indication that Hezbollah is now ready to see military resistance as part of its history. This does not mean that Hezbollah will lay down its weapons, but that any confrontations with Israel in the future are likely to be limited in nature. You don’t build a $4 million project and plan a large touristic development around it if you’re expecting to be engaged in a war.

The recent frequent critiques of Solidere are another indication of the changing nature of this division of labour between Hezbollah and Hariri. During the period of Syrian hegemony, criticism of Hariri’s monopoly over development was never translated into any meaningful action or alternative plan. In fact, the law that brought Solidere into being wouldn’t have been approved without the consent of all the major parliamentary blocks at the time. It’s very hypocritical today to deny responsibility for the decisions taken in the 90s by any of the political blocks that were in parliament then. Such criticism today is more of a declaration of intentions that, in the coming period, Hariri’s monopoly on development will be challenged.

Will Hariri be willing to concede? We will have to wait and see. But two things are for sure. First, the current escalation is only part of the tactical jostling and its effects will be contained in time in preparation for the next political period. Second, the division of labour between Hariri and Hezbollah will be reproduced in a new format, one that we haven’t quite grasped yet. We, as always, remain as spectators in all of this.

Doubts about Zaha Hadid's return to Baghdad

2010-09-21T03:19:00.000-07:00

Following my post yesterday about Zaha Hadid being commissioned to design the new building for the Central Bank of Iraq, a friend drew my attention to articles in the Iraqi press discussing the subject. It seems that another firm has been working on the design of the new CBI headquarters and is more than half way through the process. So far there has been no clarification from the CBI itself about this apparent conflict, but there's been a fair bit of speculation.

One possibility that's being discussed is that the other firm is designing a master plan for the area while Zaha will design the building itself. If that's the case, I suspect that a decision has been taken to relocate the Central Bank from central Baghdad into an area that can be secured more easily. This is the same reasoning that made the US relocate its embassy in London to a more peripheral location. Security considerations were the main one priority in that case, and they will definitely be so with the CBI.

Relocating the CBI from Al Rasheed street, a main Baghdad thoroughfare, would be regrettable. This means that the future of Baghdad is being shaped in response to the critical security situation today. Over the past few years, Baghdad streets have been harshly transformed with the concrete barriers that block all frontages. They however are still temporary measures, once the logic of security and the overcautious American attitude to protecting public buildings is accepted it will deal a harsh blow to the fabric of the city.

Rifaat Chaderchi's Telecoms Centre vandalised with concrete barriers

Baghdad should be planned with a more optimistic view to the future and an attempt at restoring civic pride. The place of important public buildings should remain central and not succumb to the logic of short-term security considerations. Baghdad always had thriving public spaces and busy streets, it would be regrettable for this to be lost by withdrawing public institutions from the centre. No amount of good design can disguise the defensive nature of buildings designed primarily in response to security.

Deconstruction doesn't mean the same in Baghdad

2010-09-20T15:05:00.000-07:00

Zaha Hadid has been appointed as the architect for the new Iraqi central bank in Baghdad, after the existing building was attacked in June. They could have asked a more reasonable Iraqi architect like, I don't know, me, but they decided to go with the big name. But joking aside, this should be interesting.

I wonder what Baghdadis will make of Zaha's design? Deconstruction doesn't quite have the same impact there, when almost every public building has been 'deconstructed' by a bomb or 'redecorated' with concrete barriers and security devices. The 'subject' has also been severely tested over the past three decades, any displacement tactics devised by Zaha are likely not to sit well. We will have to wait and see.

The existing central bank was designed by Danish firm Dissing+Weitling (I know, sounds like something an angry old man does.) It pretty much follows the typology created by Rifaat Chaderchi for several public buildings in Iraq, but with a more bulky exterior. I'm curious to see Zaha's alternative.

Note: Zaha's collaborator Patrik Schumacher, mentioned in The Independent article above, will be taking part in ManTowNHuman's first Winter School for architecture students which we are holding on the 17-18 November in London. Click here for more details.

Beirut: The City of Long Shadows

2010-09-20T08:03:00.000-07:00

Yet another article bemoaning the loss of Beirut’s architectural heritage as a result of the current construction boom. I’ve counted no less than ten articles in the western press this year, and they’ve all covered almost the exact same angle on the subject. Greedy developers, weak state, poor people kicked out of the city. While part of the picture, this narrow angle hardly provides a comprehensive view.

There are exceptional examples of Ottoman and French era buildings that merit preservation, but this is not true of all historic buildings in Beirut. Preservation makes sense from an urban point of view, such as in the Foch-Allenby area in downtown Beirut, where an entire quarter was preserved and renovated after the war. There are few areas in Beirut that still retain their historic character in a way that would make conservation meaningful.

Foch - Allenby Conservation Area

The battle to save individual buildings is misguided; it’s more a heritage fetish than a desire to conserve. Why should the Ottoman and French heritage define what Beirut should look like today? In fact, the much-despised modern towers being built in Beirut have more of a local character than the imported historical models. A combination of building codes and local tastes has created a typology that is unique to the city, and it is remarkable how in recent years, the quality has significantly improved. The pastiche that flourished for a while has given way to a more thoughtful and elegant language.

Residential tower by Nabil Gholam

It is not difficult to detect the snobbish nature of the heritage preservation campaign. Many of its leaders are architects who are dismissive of the towers being built in Beirut, while they go around promoting a vision of the city that belongs to the 19th century. Even their attempt to make a link between preserving heritage and preventing gentrification is hypocritical. The historical area of Gemayzeh is inhabited almost exclusively by architects and BoBos, as became quite clear in a recent television debate held on the main street. Gentrification is happening with and without redevelopment; the city should at least enjoy the economic benefits of the latter.

Gemayzeh

Another interesting omission in this debate is the total absence of any reference to the only successful model of conservation and redevelopment, which is the work carried out by Solidere in downtown Beirut (The fortified medieval area and the adjoining Ottoman hill.) By shifting development rights onto other sites, Solidere created the economic model that would allow for development and conservation to take place. In addition, the Solidere model allowed for the construction of modern infrastructure, making it a novelty in Beirut.

Conservation area

The result is a well-preserved historic area that no self-respecting heritage campaigner would be caught dead in. Thousands of tourists and visitors enjoy the area however, and it has become a buzzing (if over-priced) leisure destination. Perhaps it’s not to everyone’s taste, but it is a folly to believe that conservation today has anything to do with authenticity. The historic centres of European cities have long ago witnessed a similar transformation; it’s a romantic delusion to think city centres are where the natives live.

Heritage campaigns resonate well with western journalists who indulge in the fantasy that Beirut is an oasis of culture in the Middle East that should be preserved. Without fail, they all warn of Beirut becoming the next Dubai, forgetting that Beirut was the original Dubai. The heritage campaigns are manifestations of the deep unease with the pace of rapid change in Beirut and the inability of the Lebanese intellectuals to come up with an alternative vision for the city. Cities don’t have the patience to wait. I’m looking forward to more towers in Beirut; the long shadows should provide much needed shade on those hot summer days.

For information and photographs on some of the projects I worked on in Beirut, see here.

Toby Young V Architecture Ltd: 1- 0

2010-09-17T10:15:00.000-07:00

I’m not a fan of Toby Young, but when someone says something sensible I’m willing to listen. Young is planning to start a new ‘free school’ in west London. In a statement that no doubt made most architects choke on their organic Muesli he denied that there’s any link between building design and academic achievement. As to be expected, the comments sparked ‘a backlash’ among architects who ‘lined up to attack Young’. The world would be a much better place if all mobs had the decency of architects to stand in a queue when savaging someone.

The role of chief inquisitor in this ridiculous witch hunt fell to RIBA president Ruth Reed, who called Young’s comments “hugely damaging” and “absolutely false”. She added: “The danger is this myth that good architecture is a luxury. It’s almost a hairshirt idea that in the age of austerity you can’t afford good design. Poor design is a poor investment.”

See what she’s done there? Quite how she made the leap between Young saying there’s no link between architecture and academic achievement to making him seem like a champion of poor design is really baffling. I’ve given up on expecting common sense from members of the architectural establishment a long time ago, what with their adeptness at wrapping themselves in a protective layer of vacuous buzzwords and meaningless platitudes. Reed seems to be well ensconced in this semantic security blanket.

Let’s take a look at Young’s offensive statement: “We will be looking for an architect who doesn’t have too inflated an idea of how important buildings are to educational outcomes because I think the connection between the two is practically zero. Given the limited resources available, free schools are going to have to be pretty creative over the use of their spaces.” I would love this as a brief; I would certainly prefer it to the New Age mumbo jumbo about the magical qualities of ‘design’. Why are Reed and the architects who stood in line behind her so offended?

Let’s examine another little nugget of wisdom from another architect: “Good design in schools does not have to mean steel and glass extravagances built at great expense. It does mean the creation of decent space: classrooms with acoustics that allow all students to hear the teacher, fresh air and daylight to help concentration.” Mr Marston seems to come from the ‘stating the bleeding obvious’ school of thought, next week he will explain certain patterns of unhygienic bear behaviour in the woods.

But let’s get serious, there’s a real problem here. Architects have fully embraced the culture of targets and the philistine instrumental logic that drives it. There’s no way that they could justify architecture on its own terms anymore, everything has to have a measurable impact in order for it to be justified. Is there anything more ridiculous than these attempts at establishing links between good architecture and academic achievement, health and happiness?

Reed should spend her energy arguing against austerity instead of embracing it and timidly suggesting that it still leaves space for ‘good design’. She would do better to argue against free schools and the madness of transferring the responsibility for education from the state to select groups of parents. I have no problem in people setting up their own schools, but the logic behind the free schools is an admission of the state’s failure to create a successful educational system. Why should we bail the politicians out if they can’t do their jobs?

Instead, Reed spearheaded a column of disgruntled architects in a meaningless attack on Young. I personally can’t help but agree with Young. There are many reasons why we should have great architecture but the dubious environmental determinism that insists on a link between academic achievement and good design is not one of them. If we can’t make a better case for outstanding architecture, we would be letting our profession down.
In fact, I would be interested to hear Reed’s justification for Notre Dame de Paris for example. Would she argue that there’s a scientific link between the size of the windows and the atmosphere required for worshipping a monotheistic deity? Would she find a link between the angle of the pyramids of Giza and the ideal conditions to prepare for the afterlife? I dread to think what ridiculous explanations she and her fellow architects in the ‘queue of disgruntlement’ would come up with.

Great architecture, like music, art or literature, should not be instrumentally assessed. It is the weakest of faiths to justify outstanding works of architecture through a philistine worldview that is incapable of enjoying things for themselves. If architects had more self-confidence and assuredness about their profession they wouldn’t have been rattled so easily by the comments of someone who after all built a career on pissing people off. But having surrendered a long time ago to this instrumental view of architecture, the architectural establishment was visibly shaken by a very minor critique. What a sad state of affairs.

CABE and why London needs more skyscrapers

2010-09-15T09:34:00.000-07:00

A refined version of my blog calling for the abolition of CABE has been published at Blueprint. Thanks to this and a mention by the architecture and design critic Hugh Pearman, the article has sparked off much needed debate about the subject. I don't want to create the impression that I am singling out CABE for critique, I think the entire planning system in the UK and in London in particular has become a barrier to innovation and experimentation in architecture. I think my article making the case for building more (and taller) skyscrapers in London is a useful reminder of the broader points I made. Read the article published at Culture Wars. Here's a hint of what I think the London skyline should look like:

Inequality, Brazilian slums and The Spirit Level

2010-09-14T01:55:00.000-07:00

Read my article on inequality, Brazilian slums and The Spirit Level in World Architecture News. The article was inspired by a photograph of Paraisópolis favela by young Brazilian photographer Tuca Vieira and the recent debate around The Spirit Level, the book that argues that inequality is the cause of all social problems. The WAN editorial explains the context of the article.

The picture below is not Tuca Vieira's, but another photograph of Paraisópolis.

Why not abolish CABE altogether?

2010-09-13T04:01:00.000-07:00

The architectural establishment is experiencing a mild shock to the system, one of its leading lights has publicly broken rank and dared to criticise CABE. In Sunday’s Observer, Rowan Moore the former head of the Architecture Foundation wrote an article entitled ‘Bricks, mortar and mateyness’ accusing CABE of not being critical enough of badly designed buildings. “Too often CABE has found itself in the business of ameliorating bad situations with the result that it has come to look, or be, complicit with them,” said Moore. “Worse, it has looked too matey with the people it is trying to oversee and influence.”

Reading the comments on Moore’s article online, you would be excused for assuming that Moore asked for the abolition of CABE and for the public execution of all its members. But a storm in a teacup is what passes for genuine dissent in architecture these days. Some people are wetting their pants with the prospect of this mild rebuke turning into a revolution, which is indicative of how lame architectural discourse has become. After all, Moore didn’t challenge CABE’s authoritarian and unaccountable role, but actually asked for it to be stricter in its regulation of the profession.

As an architect who has witnessed CABE review panels several times in the past, my problem with it is its remit as a ‘design police’ force, an elite group that was devised in order to maintain adherence to the taste standards of architectural establishment. I might understand the need for such a body in a country that doesn’t have an established planning system. But given the structure of the planning system in Britain with its multiple agencies and broad participatory nature, CABE represents yet another obstacle to negotiate in an already complex and demanding context. It is a product of the hyper-regulation culture that embodies the elite’s authoritarian instincts today.

Yet, most architects actually support CABE and its mission. Rowan Moore’s outburst is indicative of this general sense of conformity and the desire to be monitored, inspected and regulated to the nth degree. God forbid any building should slip through the tight net of regulation and of taste as prescribed by the great and the good. Some architects might get a kick out of the snoozefests organised by CABE, but I find them tiresome, meddling and unnecessary. They have come to replace going to church on Sunday for preachy boring sessions of self-flagellation for today’s architects.

Where are the great characters like Cedric Price who would revolt against this over-scrutiny and infinite official meddling? Instead, today we get little tantrums from people who feel that CABE has let its guard down a little bit. Let’s stop obsessing about aesthetics at a time when house building has fallen to record laws, and the prospect of cuts means that very little investment in public projects will take place over the next few years. The politics of architecture are not to be found in facades and pointless discussions about the ‘public realm’, so let’s not make building even more difficult.

Screw this conformity. Let’s abolish CABE altogether and get rid of this unnecessary and authoritarian taste police.

A truth universally ignored: on Lebanon's predicament - Guest blog

2010-09-10T03:23:00.000-07:00

I received an interesting comment from a reader in response to Is Hezbollah Lebanon’s NRA? I thought I would share this comment on the blog because it addresses the hypocrisy of our discourse(s) in Lebanon. The comment dwells on the various aspects that manifest our disregard of universalism, shedding light on what is without doubt one of the main barriers towards our social and political development.

It’s very rewarding when what we write resonates with other people, and even more so when this gives us a glimmer of hope that we’re not alone in our discontent.

Fatima writes:

I did enjoy what seemed to be a pretty challenging mental exercise, citing the American example to counter the pervading claim that disarming Hezbollah's is necessary for state authority. But if we were to concede that we need all the "light" we can shed on this "thorny" issue, maybe I have to question one crucial statement you've made. Our inability to phrase this statement correctly has prevented us from finding a way out of the predicament we’re in. I am particularly concerned with the following:

"But the problem is that the right to bear arms needs to be applied universally for it to be meaningful." I think this needs to be amended in one of several possible ways: “The consistent disregard for the universality of the law in Lebanon weakens the credibility of the universal, and under different circumstances, logical argument that `Hezbollah must not remain armed because other parties are not equally armed.” Or perhaps: "For things to be meaningful in Lebanon it is not a necessary condition that they be applied universally". Etc.

Of course those two re-wordings are non-universal statements peculiar to Lebanon, as I try to recall the following (few out of many more) examples. At the basic levels of education, we have trouble "unifying" our history. We have trouble adapting our archaic language to express universal science and rules. That is as simple as it can get. Of higher complexity are the following hideous examples.

The Lebanese have always been unified against one single cause: Al-Tawteen, (naturalisation of Palestinian refugees) citing the effects this would have on the sectarian stratum (or balance, as they call it). However this did not stop the naturalisation of Palestinian Christians earlier on, or the naturalisation of Palestinian Shiites in the nineties. Another example: many Lebanese couples will strive for their babies to be born in western countries, knowing that they will be granted full citizenship and their rights will protected by law. (The UK is an exception.) The same people will however collude in denying babies born in Lebanon to non-Lebanese fathers the right to the Lebanese nationality.

A third example: the Lebanese complain about abuse of human rights, from silly incidents that they experience in western airports to the much more serious human right abuses perpetrated by Israel against the Palestinians. You see them going on demonstrations when the tides are high, condemning human rights abuses. Those same people deny Palestinians the right to own a single, simple, flat, a permanent abode for their families and offspring. Of course I shall not even go near the issue of work permits (or else I'd be straying onto a different topic).

Fourth example: we speak about the war on terror and how it’s being waged against Muslims and Arabs only because of the actions of a "handful", whilst the Lebanese would not hesitate a single moment to engage in ethnic cleansing against each other, against Palestinian civilians, or against Syrian workers, when a few leaders are responsible for the crimes.

So what’s the conclusion? I would like to suggest that it is our incapability of upholding the universality of the law that is making Hezbollah's arsenal a thorny issue. We can’t negotiate our away around this issue, and we can’t engage in a meaningful dialogue that allows us to resolve it.

You hear people from one side citing years of state neglect against the Shiite population, as well as the struggle against Israel. You hear others citing state authority and the right to have Beirut free of arms and the need to abolish the monopoly over arms by one party. But I don't think any of this is relevant, or likely to help us resolve the issue. Perhaps it’s time to admit we are masters of double standards, twisted interpretations, and biased alliances, against all universal laws? That the rule of law and justice are secondary to our whims and our desire to dominate others? Perhaps…